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This dissertation consists of two essays. 
Chapter 1:   
 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) summarize the extensive literature which 
investigates the effect of countries legal origin on a variety of corporate governance outcomes at 
the country level.  Recent papers find statistically significant differences in the ownership 
dispersion by comparing Quebec-based firms to non-Quebec Canadian firms.  This paper takes a 
similar approach and exploits intra-country variation in the United States, based on the 
observation that all US states have common law, except Louisiana which has civil law.  To 
compare dispersion in ownership within the US, I identify matched pairs for each publicly traded 
company in Louisiana.  Contrary to prior research on Canadian firms, I find no evidence that 
companies’ dispersion of ownership differs significantly between Louisiana and the remaining 
US states.  This challenges the interpretation of prior studies. 
 
Chapter 2 (co-authored with Brian M. Burnett and Bjorn N. Jorgensen): 
 This essay provides evidence on the link between legal origin and earnings attributes 
often associated with earnings quality.  Prior studies perform country-level analyses and find 
evidence that earnings quality is higher in counties with common law (English legal origin) than 
in countries with civil law (which includes French legal origin).  This paper takes a different 
approach and exploits within-country variation in Canada.  Specifically our research is motivated 
by the observation that all Canadian providences have common law with the exception of 
Quebec which has civil law.  We investigate whether common earnings attributes typically 
associated with earnings quality vary at the firm-level.  We find that earnings attributes do vary 
with legal origin.  Further, we analyze Canadian firms’ decision regarding where to incorporate 
at either the Federal or province level.  Our evidence suggests that Quebec firms’ incorporation 
decision at either the Federal (common law) or province (civil law) leads to some differences in 
earnings quality, after controlling for differences in accounting standards hypothesized by Ball, 
Kothari and Robin (2000). 
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CHAPTER 1 
Ownership and Legal Origin: Evidence from Louisiana 
  Introduction 
In a sequence of influential papers, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998) (LLSV) study the intersection between law and finance using country-level data.  
Specifically, they document that corporate governance varies with a country's legal system or 
legal origin.  Legal scholars classify the countries legal systems into either common law or civil 
law (Flores and Reynolds).  Civil law is further classified into French, German, and 
Scandinavian legal origin.  Common law is also referred to as English legal origin (with the 
exception Egypt) and both US and Canada are classified as such.  Prior research in “law and 
finance” documents lower concentrated ownership for firms located and incorporated in 
countries with common law relative to civil law countries (for a recent survey, see La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008).   
Recent papers by Attig (2005) and Bozec, Rousseau, and Laurin (2008) take a different 
approach and exploit variation within Canada by comparing Quebec with civil law to non-
Quebec provinces with common law.  These papers find statistically significant differences 
between ownership concentrations for Quebec-based firms relative to other Canadian firms.  My 
research design is motivated by the parallel observation that all US states have origins in 
common law except Louisiana which originates from civil law.  In matter of point, Louisiana had 
its first securities laws formed prior to the formation of the SEC as one of the states with Blue 
Sky laws.  Although, over time, Louisiana has integrated much of the common law structure, 
differences still remain (as evidenced by its statutes and the case Yuspeh v.  Koch).  Contrary to 
studies using within Canada variation, I find some evidence of different concentration of 
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ownership for Louisiana-based firms relative to other US firms which are similar in size and 
industry. 
A common criticism of the LLSV findings is that other factors might be causing this 
difference in ownership.  Religion, culture, language, and other factors are offered as alternative 
explanations for differences in ownership concentration.  Examining ownership concentration in 
Louisiana provides a novel setting where religion, culture and language vary little when 
compared to other U.S. states.  By comparing the concentration of ownership of firms in 
Louisiana, I am able to control for important confounding factors and further the literature on the 
effects of legal origin by potentially ruling out these alternative explanations.   
Another potential concern about cross-country studies is raised by Holderness (2009) 
who shows that concentration of ownership is inversely related to firm size.  He comments that 
most country-level studies do not account for this reality.  Specifically, since firm size can vary 
significantly across countries, cross-country studies comparing the largest firms may be, in fact, 
revealing ownership differences due to size.  This paper therefore controls for size using a 
matched-pair design and using firm-level data.  Since prior Canadian studies comparing Quebec 
firms to non-Quebec firms do not control for size, their finding of significant differences in 
ownership concentration might be driven by size. 
Finally, firms' mandatory reporting requirements may vary across countries.  This means 
that differential data availability could mechanically induce heterogeneity in the calculated 
ownership measures between countries.  In contrast, my study exclusively employs data from 
within the US.  As a consequence, my measures of dispersion of ownership should not be subject 
to this concern. 
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The cross country literature argues that differences in concentration of ownership are due 
to weaker minority shareholder rights in civil law countries.  Minority shareholders demand 
higher expected returns anticipating expropriation by majority shareholders.  This should result 
in a higher concentration of ownership.  My review of Louisiana law indicates that minority 
shareholder rights are arguably weaker when compared to other U.S. states.  Federal regulators 
might therefore be concerned whether Louisiana minority shareholders receive the same 
protection afforded in the other U.S. states, even though this does not manifest itself in 
statistically significant differences in ownership concentration. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1 summarizes the history of Louisiana with a 
focus on securities laws and how they differ relative to other US states.  Section 2 provides a 
summary of the most relevant literature.  Section 3 describes the data with emphasis on the data 
collection method employed.  Section 4 describes the empirical findings.  Section 5 performs 
robustness checks.  Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary, caveats, and suggestions for 
possible future research. 
 
1. History and Differences of Louisiana  
Louisiana has a distinct mixed culture owed to its various controlling sovereignties before 
becoming a U.S. state.  After several millennia of habitation by Native Americans, what is now 
Louisiana was first discovered by Spanish explorers in the 1500s.  The mouth of the Mississippi 
River was first settled by the Spanish in 1528.  Although several expeditions of this area were 
completed, no claims were made.  In the late 1600s, several French expeditions were 
accomplished in the pursuit of sovereign, religious and commercial claims.  Robert Cavelier de 
La Salle designated the area drained by the Mississippi “La Louisiane”, meaning “Land of 
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Louis”, for France in honor of then King Louis XIV.  The area extended from the Gulf of 
Mexico north to the French territories in Canada.  Several French settlements were established to 
trade with the Spanish in what is now Texas and to deter encroachment by the Spaniards.  The 
port city of New Orleans was founded by Jean Baptiste Le Moyne in 1718 and named after the 
Duke of Orleans, Phillipe II.  Recognizing its geographical importance of the mouth of the 
Mississippi River, New Orleans was designated the seat of civilian and military authority in 
1722.  Louisiana officially became a French crown colony in 1731.  Adding to Louisiana’s 
diversity, Germans immigrated to a region along the Mississippi that is still referred to as the 
German Coast in the 1720s.   
As a result of the French and Indian Wars, France relinquished its claims to Louisiana.  In 
1763, areas west of the Mississippi were ceded to Spain, and a year later the territories east of the 
river went to Great Britain.  This, however, did not end French influence in the region.  In 1765, 
French settlers migrated from Canadian territories that were lost to Britain in the Seven Years’ 
War.  These mostly Catholic French Acadians were welcomed by the Spanish rulers and are 
known today as Cajuns.  Louisiana remained in Spanish control until 1800 when the secret 
Treaty of San Ildefonso acquiesced control to Napoleon Bonaparte, and the French re-established 
their presence in the area.  By 1802, the newly formed United States was wary of having a 
European power on its western border and was aware of the trade significance of the port of New 
Orleans.  U.S. President Thomas Jefferson attempted to buy New Orleans from Bonaparte for $2 
million.  Hearing this news, the Spanish, still in control of the city and much of Louisiana, shut 
down the port to all U.S. commerce.  Jefferson sent an envoy to France, offering $10 million for 
the city.  Bonaparte, in desperate need of money to continue his war with England, sold the entire 
area to the U.S. for $15 million in what is known as the Louisiana Purchase.  The geographical 
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size of the U.S. doubled overnight.  In late 1803, Louisiana was officially transferred first to the 
French for a day and then to the U.S.  The lower region of Louisiana, known as the territory of 
Orleans, became the 18th U.S. state in 1812.  Louisiana’s various controlling sovereignties played 
an important role in the development of its distinctive legal system. 
 “Every student of the common law learns early on that Louisiana is unique in the United 
States in being a civil law jurisdiction…an island of Roman law in the midst of a common law 
ocean” (Richards 2004).  Because of its colonial history of alternating governance from France 
and Spain, it is not surprising that Louisiana’s legal origins are quite different from other English 
settled states.  The first official law of the land in Louisiana was the Customs of Paris.  King 
Louis XIV declared these rules to be in effect when he granted the area royal charter in 1712.  
When the Spanish took control of the area in the late 1760’s, Spanish Governor Don Alexander 
O’Reilly established a court system and a set of instructions known as O’Reilly’s code.  French 
colonists in the New Orleans area, though, still tended to resolve disputes themselves via French 
law.   Because of this, when the French briefly and secretively regained control of the region, 
O’Reilly’s code remained the official law of the land even though French law was mostly 
enforced.  When the US purchased the area through the Louisiana Purchase, the French and 
Spanish colonists, now called Creoles, resisted the Anglo-American law suggested by the 
Territory of Orleans’ first governor, W.C.C.  Claiborne.  However, in 1804, the Legislative 
Council imposed common law for the areas of criminal law and procedure.  However, in 1806 
the legislature recommended that Spanish civil law be adopted, and a civil code for the territory 
was drafted.  Carefully authored to resolve conflicts between Spanish and French civil law and 
somewhat modeled from France’s 1804 Code Napoleon, The 1808 Code was adopted.  
Unfortunately it was not clear whether this code was to supplant all previous laws, so in 1825 
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this code was revised further and specified that all previous laws were repealed.  French and 
English versions regrettably cause some confusion, so in 1870 an English-only version of The 
Code was adopted and remains in use today.  Louisiana’s Code has several distinctions from the 
other 49 states laws. 
 The Code is not the only unique part of Louisiana’s law.  Like several other states 
Louisiana enacted Blue Sky Laws in the early 1900s for the purpose of regulating securities 
transactions.  The first state to have such laws in place was Kansas in 1911.  Louisiana followed 
and adopted its Blue Sky Laws in 1912.  In an attempt to standardize these laws, the US 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1993 was created to regulate the offering, trading and disclosures 
of public securities at the federal level.  It is important to note that the state’s Blue Sky Laws 
remain in effect.  Also, the 49 non-Louisiana states are affected by the large body of case law 
previously ruled by judges.  Astarita notes under “Common Law and the Securities Markets”: 
In addition to the varied securities rules and regulations enacted by statute, there is a large 
body of case law, decisions by judges, which impact severely on the securities industry.  
Briefly there is the concept of common law fraud, and in theory, if perchance a particular 
act did not fall within the scope of the federal securities laws, the actor may still be 
subject to a fraud claim under common law…common law notions of contract and 
negligence also find their way into securities law.1   
 
 Comparisons between Louisiana’s Code and other states’ laws can be difficult to 
enumerate.  There are two factors that make delineating the distinction difficult.  First, The Code 
is not meant to be a straight jacket but more of a set of safeguards (Moreteau 2008).  It might be 
more appropriate to compare The Code to The Constitution in this respect, particularly The Bill 
of Rights.  For instance, The Code specifies, “Everyone has the right to respect for his private 
life” and “Everyone has the right to respect of the presumption of innocence.”  Second, 
                              
1
 “Introduction to the Securities Laws”, http://www.seclaw.com/seclaw.htm 
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Louisiana is a state in the US and, therefore, is subject to the US Constitution and other federal 
laws.  Even though Louisiana law is melding closely with other state laws, there still remain non-
trivial variations that could potentially effect investor protections. 
In addition to major differences of legal terms and organizational structure, The Code 
varies from common law on the role of judges.  Civil law systems are designed to restrain the 
power of judges.  Common law judges rely on precedence set by previous cases, whereas, in a 
civil system judges rely solely on applying the circumstances of the case before them to the 
applicable laws.  The lower courts of Louisiana do, though, tend to follow interpretations of The 
Code made by higher courts.  Obviously, a judge’s role in civil suits could have a substantial 
impact on the outcome.    
Inheritance law is quite different as well.  Forced heirship is used in Louisiana’s 
inheritance laws.  Property law tends to differ in the way property is transferred, but neither is 
more restrictive than the other.  Under civil law marital property is considered communal as 
opposed to separate under common law.   
The three items that might most affect Louisiana firms’ behavior differently than any 
other states consists of contract law, mediation, and the adoption of the Uniform Commercial 
Code.  The common law states use “consideration” in determining whether a contract is 
enforceable or not.  That is, something of value must be given by both parties for a contract to be 
enforceable.  In Louisiana, contracts are considered enforceable depending on their legal “cause” 
and form.  If a contract is in written form, it may be enforceable even if it has been made for a 
gratuitous cause (Richards, 2004).   The role of the notary is far more important in civil law.  A 
civil law notary acts as a mediator between those with differing interests.  Finally, Louisiana is 
the only state that has not fully adopted the Uniform Commercial Code.  It incrementally adopted 
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the U.C.C.  In 1990, it adopted all Chapters except for Articles 2 and 2A which encompasses the 
sale of goods and leases, respectively.  This part of the U.C.C.  is in conflict with some areas of 
Louisiana’s Code and remains separate Louisiana law. 
     Today, Louisiana is a decidedly mixed jurisdiction based on civil and common law in which 
“civil law and common law meet, merge and interact at the level of legal rules, institutions and 
reasoning methods.” (Palmer 1999). Though mixed with common law, the civil code of 
Louisiana is still functioning. It utilizes legal precepts unknown in common law jurisdictions 
such as naked owners, usufructs, virile portions, vulgar substitutions, synallagmatic contracts, 
mystic testaments, antichresis, whimsical conditions, or lesion beyond moiety, amicable 
compounder, jactitation, mutuum, and commodatum (Kinsella 1994). Cases that might have one 
outcome in a common law state will have a different outcome under Louisiana civil law, as with 
cases related to the civil law compromise article and its common law cousin, the doctrine of 
accord and satisfaction; (Richardson 2008); cases related to promissory estoppel – a common 
law doctrine that exists in a unique civil law form in Louisiana (Palmer1999); and testate cases 
related to Louisiana’s unique civil law forced heirship requirements for the maintenance of 
children under 24 (Palmer 1999). 
     And far from dying out, the Louisiana civil code has been undergoing a complete (if not 
painfully slow) reform since 1960s and 40% of the code as already been revised and renewed to 
reflect current needs (Palmer 2005). As Louisiana Judge Dennis wrote in 2003, “our Civil Code 
endures and generally governs the all important area of Louisiana's private law, including the law 
of persons, family, property, successions, obligations, offenses and quasi-offenses, matrimonial 
regimes, leases, sales, privileges, mortgages, and prescription. The 1870 Civil Code has now 
been revised with the hope that it will be an authoritative statement of the civilian tradition of the 
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state within the scheme of a modern, scientific, comprehensive organization. Thus, the tradition 
of codified laws is firmly established in Louisiana.” (Dennis 2003). In last third of twentieth 
century there was a revival movement of civil law in Louisiana, particularly in the area of tort 
law. While the trend has slowed, LA courts continue to re-infuse tort law in LA with civil law 
influences in resistance to the prevalent influences of common law in tort. (Palmer 2005). 
     In terms of the role of judges, because it is mixed jurisdiction the role of judges in Louisiana 
is unique – judges take a much more active role in the shaping of the law than in French civil 
law; but like French judges, they are expected to primarily interpret the code when it applies. 
(Dennis 2003).  
An example of how investor protections, specifically minority shareholder rights, may 
differ under the Louisiana Civil Code can be found in the case Yuspeh v.  Koch.  In this case, 
Koch, a majority shareholder of Certified Security Systems, attempted to gain full control of the 
company via a freeze-out merger with a set cash price to buy out minority shareholders.  Yuseph 
and minority shareholders sued for what they deemed to be an inadequate stock price.  Further 
the minority shareholders had not been informed of Koch’s increased ownership of the company 
which was through unissued stock purchases via a loan restructuring agreement and, therefore, 
sued for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.  Koch filed an exception of no right of action 
arguing that Louisiana Revised Statute section 12:131 (from Louisiana’s Civil Code) was the 
sole remedy for obtaining the fair value for their shares.  This would have required Yuspeh to 
have used an injunction to slow the merger process and receive fair value for their shares.  The 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Louisiana statue is not the exclusive remedy 
because it does not address fraud or breach of fiduciary responsibility.  Although the court ruled 
that no fraud was committed, it ruled there was a breach of fiduciary responsibility by not 
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informing shareholders of the additional stock purchase.  This breach was a direct cause for the 
plaintiffs not being able to utilize the statue to obtain fair value for their positions.  Although the 
ruling helped align Louisiana’s protection of minority shareholder’s rights in this case 
(specifically similar to Delaware’s Weinberger v.  UOP, Inc.  decision), calls for a statute to 
better identify these protections remain.  “A new Louisiana appraisal rights statute should 
include a requirement that a minority shareholder be given proper shareholder notice before and 
after the merger vote to provide him with greater knowledge of his rights and responsibilities.”2    
  
2. Literature Review 
 In an oft cited paper, Law and Finance, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(LLSV) examine legal protection of investors across countries with differing legal origins 
(common law, and French, German, and Scandinavian civil law).  In doing so they find that 
concentration of ownership differs across these legal origins.  Concentration of ownership is 
found by finding the ownership of the 3 largest shareholders in the 10 largest privately owned 
domestic firms.  Countries with French civil law origin have a significantly higher average 
(54%) than the other 3 origins.  Common law has a concentration of 43% ownership.  In this 
paper we intend to see if this result holds for a within country comparison. 
As evidence of the impact of the “law and finance” literature on legal studies, Coffee 
(2007) summarizes what he labels the principal objections leveled against the LLSV point of 
view.  First, French civil law seems to have performed well for France.  France has had greater 
economic growth than the UK over most of the time since 1820.  Second, the classification of 
                              
2
 Aiken (2004) 
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Latin American countries as civil law entities is debatable.  The failure of many of these 
countries appears to drive the conclusion that civil law countries economically underperform.  
Third, LLSV’s coding method is questionable, creating indices that are later used as proxies that 
are disputed.  Fourth, there is a plethora of civil law and common law countries that have 
performed well or poorly, respectively.   For instance, several Asian countries with civil law 
origins have prospered while many sub-Saharan African countries with common law background 
remain largely undeveloped.   Fifth, legal origins are shown to be confounded with other 
structural factors that would influence growth.  For instance, civil law tended to be adopted in 
tropical environments, whereas common laws were adopted in healthier, more temperate areas.   
None of these five objections apply to my investigation of the effect of civil law on dispersion of 
ownership. 
In two influential papers, Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue and 
provide empirical evidence that firms’ size and industry are key determinants of concentration of 
ownership within the US.  LLSV argue that legal variables (civil vs. common law as well as 
legal origin) are main determinants of variation in ownership structure around the world.  As 
mentioned above, Holderness (2009) worries that the largest firms of each country, included in 
LLSV, vary greatly in size.  Further, he argues that the firms in the main common law countries 
(Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, UK, and US) are larger in size than the firms in civil 
law countries.  Put differently, he argues that LLSV is incorrectly attributing cross-country 
variation in ownership to legal origin when it is truly attributable to variation in firm size.  My 
study addresses this concern by employing a matched pair design within the US. 
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This paper investigates whether there is any evidence of an effect of heterogeneity in 
legal systems persists within the US simply because Louisiana has French legal origin.3  
Specifically, I hypothesize and test whether firms "based" in Louisiana have higher concentrated 
ownership.  Such heterogeneity in legal origin also arises, arguably to a larger extent, within 
Canada because Quebec's French legal origin.  Indeed, Attig and Gadhoum (2003) and Bozec, 
Rousseau, and Laurin (2008) find evidence that Quebec firms have more concentrated 
ownership.  These findings from Canada, however, do not easily allow trivial extrapolation into a 
US setting.  The reason is that Canada has regulators at the province level.  In contrast, the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission is the leading U.S. regulator.  Such differences in 
enforcement and regulation between Canada and US imply that statistically significant 
differences in concentration of ownership are a priori less likely to have remained within the US.  
Documenting any such differences should be of interest to federal regulators since they should be 
concerned about whether unequal enforcement in the state of Louisiana is the source of these 
differences.  The only existing evidence to this effect is a recent paper by Kedia and Rajgopal 
(2010) who document that the proximity of a firm’s headquarters to the nearest SEC office is a 
determinant of the likelihood of an SEC investigation. 
A host of literature investigates the relations between legal origin, ownership 
concentration, investor and property rights, private benefits of control, firm value and 
profitability, external financing, cost of capital, and transparency.  Dyck and Zingales (2004) 
estimate the private benefits of control across 39 countries.  They note that private benefits of 
control are difficult to measure and verify – otherwise non-controlling members would be able to 
                              
3
  I do not claim to be the first to exploit intra-country variation.  For example, Jayaratne and Strahan 
(1996) document the effect of removing banking restrictions on state-level economic growth within the 
US. 
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prevent such actions.  By following Barclay and Holderness (1989) and examining controlling 
block sales, specifically the difference between the acquiring and market prices, the private 
benefit accruing to the controlling shareholder is determined.  A total of 393 transactions across 
39 countries in the 1990s are used.  On average corporate control is found to be worth 14 percent 
of the equity value of the firm (ranging from -4% to 65%).  They also note that in countries with 
less investor protections, the premium paid for control is higher.  This is due to the buyers being 
able to more easily extract private benefits in such an environment.   Pertinent to this paper Dyck 
and Zingales investigate the dispersion of ownership across these countries.  They show that the 
percentage of widely held companies is smaller in countries with higher private benefits of 
control.  This is due to existing owners wanting to keep control in such an environment.  In fact a 
one standard deviation increase in the size of private benefits results in an 11% increase in 
ownership by the three largest shareholders. 
By comparing Non-U.S. firms that cross-list on U.S. exchanges with those that do not, 
Doidge (2004) finds evidence in support of the bonding hypothesis.  That is that firms also listed 
on U.S. exchanges benefit from the better protection on minority shareholders resulting in a 
decrease to the private benefits of controlling shareholders.  A total of 745 non-U.s. firms that 
have dual-class shares from 1994-2001 are included in the data.  Those firms that also cross-list 
on U.S. exchanges have voting premiums that are 43 percent lower than the firms that do not 
cross-list.  This premium increases for firms in countries that are determined to have lower 
protections for minority shareholders.  Upon announcement of the cross-listing, all classes of 
shareholders benefit – regardless of their voting rights.  Considering the 11 days surrounding the 
cross-listing announcement, the high-voting shares gain 0.57% while the low-voting shares gain 
1.12%.  This holds true even though the low-class shares are usually the only shares cross-listed.  
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Further, the firms in countries with lower investor protections tend to have higher announcement 
returns than those with great shareholder protections.  All of these findings support the bonding 
hypothesis. 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love (2004) examine the effects of legal origin on the cost of capital.  
In an effort to mitigate the principal-agent problem, insiders maintain a larger share of their firms 
than in an optimal risk diversification strategy.  Their model has two predictions.  First, weaker 
investor protection should result in higher concentration of inside ownership.  This conforms to 
LLSV (1997).  Second, a higher the concentration of inside ownership should result in a higher 
implied cost of capital.  These predictions are shown to empirically hold true using firm-level 
data from 6000 firms across 38 countries from 1988-1998.  Specifically, the resulting premium 
due to the exposure to higher idiosyncratic risk by insiders is found to be between zero and six 
percent.  As outside investor protection increases, this premium decreases.   
Classens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (1999) examine the relationship between firm value 
and ownership concentration across nine countries in East Asia.  Unlike most developed 
countries, they conclude that the most important agency issue for East Asian countries is limiting 
the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders, as opposed to the owner-
manager principal-agent problem.  Higher cash flow rights are linked with higher market 
valuations.  However, higher voting control results in negligible or even negative firm value.  
Specifically, firm value is shown to decrease 3 percent for a 10 percent increase in the separation 
between cash-flow and voting rights.  The method of separation between cash flow and voting 
rights (pyramiding, cross-holdings, and dual class shares) is not important.  All methods result in 
a decrease in firm value.  This might suggest that once large owners control a firm, expropriation 
of minority shareholders becomes more significant than creating firm value.    
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Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2003) document a link between governance transparency and 
legal origin.  Corporate transparency, defined as “the availability of firm-specific information to 
those outside publicly traded firms.”  This is further divided into financial transparency and 
governance transparency.  The latter is defined as “the intensity of governance disclosures used 
by outside investors to hold officers and directors accountable.”  Countries with common law 
legal origin are found to have a higher governance transparency.   
Durnev and Kim (2005) examine firm-level governance and disclosure practices across 
27 countries.  Countries with lower investor protections tend to have a more variation in these 
measures.  They look at three firm attributes (investment opportunities, external financing, and 
ownership structure), and form a model that predicts that firms with higher measures of these 
attributes will have better governance, be more highly valued, and that these relations are 
stronger when investor protections are weaker.  These predictions are tested across 859 firms are 
found to hold true.  Specifically a one standard deviation increase in governance score results in 
a 9% higher market valuation.  In weaker investor protected environments, such as Mexico, a 
one standard deviation increase in governance score is associated with a 13.2% increase in 
market value while in more strongly investor protected Hong Kong, the deviation only creates a 
4.6% increase.  Good corporate governance is given a premium in settings where investor 
protections are weak. 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) examine the significance of protections for citizens from 
expropriation by the government or privileged and the role of contracting between citizens.  
They conclude that protection from expropriation is more pertinent to economic growth, 
investment, and financial development than contracting rights.  Using a multiple instrument 
variable strategy, countries with greater investor protections are found to have higher income per 
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capita, greater investment rates, more credit to the private sector relative to GDP, and more 
developed stock markets.  They note that this is consistent with Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (2002).   Private contracting between citizens is not able to overcome the 
iniquity created by poor investor protections.  This results in lower overall economic 
development. 
Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) also confirm the importance of investor 
protections for economic development.  They use 1997 survey data from small manufacturing 
firms in five Eastern European developing countries.  This environment was chosen specifically 
to disentangle the effects of external financing available and property rights.  These two items 
are highly positively correlated across countries.  However, all of these countries have weak 
institutional environments for external financing, while the extent to which property rights are 
protected is variable.  They found that where property rights are strong, firms tend to reinvest 
their profits more so than when property rights are weak.  Specifically, entrepreneurs in countries 
with the highest rights reinvest 56% of their profits as opposed to just 32% of profits for the 
countries with lowest rights.  This is the case even when controlling for access to bank credit.  
The result is that property rights are therefore sufficient for investment. 
 Finally Bhagat and Bolton (2009) use a system of equations model to investigate the 
interdependencies of firm performance, governance, ownership, and leverage.  They find that 
stock ownership of directors is positively and significantly related to firm performance.  Since 
other measures of governance yield inconsistent results, they suggest that corporate governance 
studies should use stock ownership as the most reliable measure for governance. 
Another strand of literature that is applicable to this paper is the home bias literature.  
International investment portfolios tend to overweight domestic securities.  Coval and 
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Moskowitz (1999) also show that U.S. investment managers have a preference for locally 
headquartered firms.  This is especially true for smaller, highly levered firms that produce non-
traded goods.  A state with a lower level of income per capita (and possibly more concentration 
of income), might affect ownership concentration for firms headquartered in that state.  I include 
income per capita in the regressions to control for this possibility.   
Another confounding factor in this study is the fact that firms are able to choose the state 
in which they incorporate.  Further, the state of incorporation determines which corporate laws 
the firm is then subject to.  Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) identify many factors that determine the 
incorporation choice.  Their main finding is that location has a substantial influence on the 
incorporation decision.  That is, firms tend to incorporate in the state in which they are located.  
This home bias is weaker for both larger companies and for companies that have incorporated 
more recently.  Several other factors are offered as possible determinants of the incorporation 
choice, which I use in the first stage of my Heckman regression analysis.   
These findings are similar to Dammann and Schundeln (2009).  They, too, find that a 
majority of corporations incorporate in their primary place of business.  However, firms with 
more than 1,000 employees incorporate in their home state about half the time and usually 
incorporate in Delaware when not incorporating in the home state.  They also find that 
corporations are more likely to migrate away from states that offer higher minority shareholder 
protection.  I use this information throughout the Heckman regressions. 
 
3. Data 
I first use annual data from the Compustat Xpressfeed North America database for fiscal 
years ending from January 1950 to December 2008 to identify my matched sample of firms.  I 
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identify my sample firms by selecting all firms incorporated and/or headquartered in Louisiana 
and retain the final year they are in Compustat.  This results in a sample of 101 firms with fiscal 
years ranging from 1987 to 2008.  The 101 firms are further reduced to 88 by deleting those that 
are wholly owned subsidiaries of one another (9), not truly incorporated in Louisiana (2), 
duplicated listing (1) and not publically traded (1).  Our population of available control firms is 
all other US firms neither incorporated nor located in Louisiana.  I matched our sample of 
Louisiana firms with a control firm in the same 3-digit SIC code and same fiscal year based on 
total assets (data item AT).  In Table 1, a t-test of differences of the means of total assets 
between the two samples confirms quality matches (p-value < .01).   
Ownership data was collected from various SEC filings (10-K, Proxy Statements, etc.) 
via the SEC’s website (EDGAR), Lexis Nexis Classic, and from microfiche in the LEEDS 
Library.  Since I am examining concentration of ownership as a quality of corporate governance, 
I chose to look at percentage of voting control.  For companies with only one class of common 
stock with 1 share = 1 vote the collection was straight-forward.   For companies with different 
stock classes with different amounts of voting rights, ownership percentages were re-calculated 
to reflect percent of voting power.  All footnotes were reviewed to avoid double counting 
between family members and/or shares held in trusts.   This methodology closely follows 
Holderness (2009). 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the 88 firms either incorporated or located in Louisiana 
and their Non-Louisiana matches.  Matching is based on the same 3 digit SIC code and then 
closest in total assets.  Panel B provides an Industry breakdown for the sample.  Data is from 
Compustat.  Total Assets, Market Value, and Sales are in $ millions.  Leverage is debt (short 
term + long term) / total assets.  Panels C & D only include the 47 firms incorporated in 
Louisiana while Panels E & F only include the 41 firms located in Louisiana.  ***, **, * 
indicates t-test of means statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-
tailed). ###, ##, # indicates Wilcoxon test statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively (two-tailed). 
Panel A: All Louisiana Firms 
  Louisiana (N =  88 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N =  88 firms) 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean   Median   
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Assets 1,752.56 304.22 4,924.28 1,826.70 323.69 4,889.89 
Market Value 695.51 87.72 1,837.88 814.15 140.33 1,998.46 
Leverage 0.40 0.29 0.46 0.29 ** 0.24 + 0.23 
Sales 580.63 184.80 1,414.37 718.15 ** 166.63 1,866.27 
                    
 
Panel B: Industry Distribution – Full Sample 
Industry (Two-digit SIC Codes) 
Numbe
r of 
Firms 
Percentag
e 
Construction (15-17) 2 2% 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (60-67) 20 23% 
Manufacturing (20-39) 15 17% 
Mining (10-14) 19 22% 
Public Administration (91-99) 2 2% 
Retail Trade (52-59) 6 7% 
Services (70-89) 12 14% 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 
(40-49) 9 10% 
Wholesale Trade (50-51) 3 3% 
  88 100% 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
Panel C: Firms Incorporated in Louisiana  
  Louisiana (N =  47 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N =  47 firms) 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean   Median   
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Assets  1,861.50       265.87    4,076.19   2,097.15   *       394.92    4,507.77  
Market Value     502.63         84.38       962.86      751.55   *       145.89   +    1,760.62  
Leverage         0.37           0.23           0.48          0.31           0.26           0.26  
Sales     489.77       123.08    1,125.23      707.10   *       172.27    1,748.88  
                    
 
Panel D: Industry Distribution – Incorporated in Louisiana  
Industry (Two-digit SIC Codes) 
Numbe
r of 
Firms 
Percentag
e 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (60-67) 18 38% 
Manufacturing (20-39) 6 13% 
Mining (10-14) 5 11% 
Public Administration (91-99) 1 2% 
Retail Trade (52-59) 5 11% 
Services (70-89) 6 13% 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 
(40-49) 6 13% 
  47 100% 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
Panel E: Firms Located in Louisiana  
  Louisiana (N =  41 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N =  41 firms) 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean   Median   
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Assets 
1,627.6
8  306.23  5,796.81  1,516.67  299.18   +  5,334.24  
Market 
Value 907.20  267.58  2,463.78  885.91  106.32  2,260.97  
Leverage 0.43  0.34  0.44  0.26  
*
*  0.24  
 
++  0.20  
Sales 684.79  238.08  1,695.30  730.81  163.24  2,014.40  
                    
 
Panel F: Industry Distribution – Located in Louisiana 
Industry (Two-digit SIC Codes) 
Numbe
r of 
Firms 
Percentag
e 
Construction (15-17) 2 5% 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (60-67) 2 5% 
Manufacturing (20-39) 9 22% 
Mining (10-14) 14 34% 
Public Administration (91-99) 1 2% 
Retail Trade (52-59) 1 2% 
Services (70-89) 6 15% 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 
(40-49) 3 7% 
Wholesale Trade (50-51) 3 7% 
  41 100% 
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In order to determine the concentration of ownership in all the firms, I collected 9 
variables of interest.  Blockholders are shareholders with greater than 5% ownership: 
1-3.  % ownership of 1st, 2nd and 3rd largest blockholders 
4.  Cumulative % ownership of all blockholders 
5. Number of blockholders 
6. Cumulative % ownership of all directors and officers 
7. Number of directors and officers (hand-counted if not listed) 
8. % ownership of CEO if a blockholder 
9. % ownership of Chairman of the Board if a blockholder 
Table 1 offers descriptive statistics for both samples comparing total assets, market value, 
leverage, and sales.  The table well matched samples as well as an even distribution throughout 2 
digit SIC industries.  Table 2 gives the mean, median and standard deviation for the 9 variables 
collected for both the Louisiana and the (averaged) non-Louisiana samples.  A comparison of the 
number of times the CEO or Chairman of the Board was also the largest blockholder are 
included. 
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Table 2.  Comparison of Concentration of Ownership 
This table shows mean, median, and standard deviation comparisons between Louisiana and Non-
Louisiana firms for the 9 hand-collected ownership concentration variables from SEC filings.  Panel A 
shows the full sample, while Panels B & C break down the sample into incorporated and located in 
Louisiana respectively.  Blockholders are shareholders controlling greater than 5% voting rights.  Largest 
shareholder is contingent on controlling greater than 5%, otherwise 0% is used. 
Panel A: All Louisiana Firms 
  Louisiana (N = 88 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N = 88 firms) 
Variable N Mean 
Media
n 
Standard 
Deviation   N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Largest blockholder 82 25.69 15.40 22.46 84 18.73 14.90 13.28 
Second largest blockholder 65 10.56 8.70 6.43 72 11.48 9.33 6.96 
Third largest blockholder 44 7.70 7.50 2.36 48 9.26 8.65 4.04 
All Blockholders (%) 81 42.13 38.10 26.03 83 39.54 36.46 24.93 
All Blockholders (#) 88 2.76 2.50 1.60 88 3.01 3.00 1.84 
All Officers and Directors 
(%) 88 22.97 15.70 24.59 88 18.65 11.00 19.47 
All Officers and Directors 
(#) 88 12.70 11.00 6.97 88 11.91 11.00 6.08 
CEO Blockholders (%) 30 26.36 13.85 25.76 26 19.23 12.45 13.98 
Chair Blockholders (%) 35 28.91 16.37 25.06 29 20.27 20.50 14.01 
CEO = Largest blockholder 14 26 
Chair = Largest blockholder 23 29 
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Table 2.  Comparison of Concentration of Ownership (continued) 
Panel B: Firms Incorporated in Louisiana  
  Louisiana (N = 47 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N = 47 firms) 
Variable N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Largest blockholder 43 25.02 12.60 23.35 46 15.51 12.50 10.68 
Second largest blockholder 32 10.18 9.12 5.35 36 11.16 8.77 7.17 
Third largest blockholder 21 7.29 7.00 2.05 21 9.46 8.70 3.69 
All Blockholders (%) 43 40.13 33.80 26.50 46 32.15 27.10 23.58 
All Blockholders (#) 47 2.57 2.00 1.58 47 2.64 2.00 1.72 
All Officers and Directors (%) 47 26.51 18.17 26.74 47 17.08 8.84 16.89 
All Officers and Directors (#) 47 13.32 11.00 8.48 47 12.60 12.00 6.77 
CEO Blockholders (%) 13 29.18 10.45 30.06 10 16.37 11.66 10.00 
Chair Blockholders (%) 17 32.62 30.50 28.04 14 17.59 11.66 12.51 
CEO = Largest blockholder 6 10 
Chair = Largest blockholder 13 14 
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Table 2.  Comparison of Concentration of Ownership (continued) 
Panel C: Firms Located in Louisiana  
  Louisiana (N = 41 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N = 41 firms) 
Variable N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Largest blockholder 39 26.42 16.37 21.71 38 22.62 15.95 15.13 
Second largest blockholder 33 10.93 8.54 7.39 36 11.79 9.56 6.83 
Third largest blockholder 23 8.08 7.60 2.60 27 9.11 7.90 4.37 
All Blockholders (%) 38 44.40 41.37 25.65 37 48.73 47.70 23.76 
All Blockholders (#) 41 2.98 3.00 1.62 41 3.46 3.00 1.90 
All Officers and Directors (%) 41 18.92 11.90 21.48 41 20.50 11.09 22.19 
All Officers and Directors (#) 41 12.00 11.00 4.70 41 11.10 10.50 5.12 
CEO Blockholders (%) 17 24.21 14.70 22.66 16 21.01 14.20 16.02 
Chair Blockholders (%) 18 25.41 15.65 22.12 15 22.76 22.00 15.28 
CEO = Largest blockholder 8 16 
Chair = Largest blockholder 10 15 
                    
 
  
26 
 
 
  
 
4. Results 
Table 3 displays the results of univariate tests comparing concentration of ownership 
variables of interest.  These include largest blockholder, cumulative percent owned and number 
of all blockholders, and cumulative percent owned and number of all directors and officers as a 
group.  The table is separated into 3 panels: firms incorporated or located in Louisiana; firms 
incorporated in Louisiana; and firms headquartered, but not incorporated in, Louisiana.  A t-test, 
non-parametric medians test and Wilcoxon test is performed to check for differences in the 
means and medians.  Although marginally significant, I do find some differences in ownership 
concentration.  Louisiana firms are shown to have a higher percentage of ownership for both the 
largest blockholder as well as the cumulative percent ownership by all officers and directors as a 
group.  As expected this is most significant for in the Louisiana incorporated subset (Panel B).  
For firms incorporated in Louisiana, the largest blockholder owns 25.0% versus 15.5% for non-
Louisiana firms.  All officers and directors as a group own 26.5% for Louisiana incorporated 
firms versus 17.1% for non-Louisiana firms.  This is consistent with both the LLSV and 
Canadian findings.  Civial law Louisiana firms have a higher concentration of ownership than 
the other common law states.   
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Table 3.  Univariate Tests 
This table displays the results of univariate tests comparing concentration of ownership variables of interest.  Panel A shows the full sample, while 
Panels B & C break down the sample into incorporated and located in Louisiana respectively.  A t-test, non-parametric medians test and 
Wilcoxon test is performed to check for differences in the means and medians.  ***, **, * indicates t-test of means statistically different at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). +++, ++, + indicates non-parametric medians test statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively (two-tailed). ###, ##, # indicates Wilcoxon test statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). P-
values are in (parenthesis). 
Panel A: All Louisiana Firms 
  Louisiana (N =  88 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N =  88 firms)   Differences 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean t-test 
non-
parametric 
medians 
test 
Wilcoxon 
test 
Largest blockholder 25.69 15.40 22.46 18.73 14.90 13.28 4.64 * 
( 0.062) ( 0.224) (0.301) 
All Blockholders (%) 42.13 38.10 26.03 39.54 36.46 24.93 0.91 
( 0.775) ( 0.942) ( 0.547) 
All Blockholders (#) 2.76 2.50 1.60 3.01 3.00 1.84 -0.27 
( 0.206) ( 0.198) ( 0.488) 
All Officers and Directors (%) 22.97 15.70 24.59 18.65 11.00 19.47 4.58 
( 0.122) ( 0.671) ( 0.336) 
All Officers and Directors (#) 12.70 11.00 6.97 11.91 11.00 6.08 0.78 
( 0.283) ( 0.234) ( 0.603) 
                          
 
  
  
  28
 
Table 3. Univariate Tests (continued) 
Panel B: Firms Incorporated in Louisiana 
  Louisiana (N =  47 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N =  47 firms)   Differences 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean t-test 
non-
parametric 
medians 
test 
Wilcoxon 
test 
Largest blockholder 25.02 12.60 23.35 15.51 12.50 10.68 6.75 * 
( 0.0675) ( 0.2037) ( 0.2766) 
All Blockholders (%) 40.13 33.80 26.50 32.15 27.10 23.58 4.32 
( 0.3630) ( 0.3386) ( 0.1373) 
All Blockholders (#) 2.57 2.00 1.58 2.64 2.00 1.72 -0.06 
( 0.8149) ( 0.5914) (0.8893) 
All Officers and Directors (%) 26.51 18.17 26.74 17.08 8.84 16.89 9.43 ** # 
( 0.0404) ( 0.1584) ( 0.0917) 
All Officers and Directors (#) 13.32 11.00 8.48 12.60 12.00 6.77 0.72 
( 0.5339) ( 0.6196) (0.8543) 
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Table 3. Univariate Tests (continued) 
Panel C: Firms Located in Louisiana 
  Louisiana (N =  41 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N =  41 firms)   Differences 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean t-test 
non-
parametric 
medians 
test 
Wilcoxon 
test 
Largest blockholder 26.42 16.37 21.71 22.62 15.95 15.13 2.17 
( 0.5134) ( 0.7003) ( 0.8745) 
All Blockholders (%) 44.40 41.37 25.65 48.73 47.70 23.76 -3.30 
( 0.4239) ( 0.2804) ( 0.4455) 
All Blockholders (#) 2.98 3.00 1.62 3.46 3.00 1.90 -0.51 
( 0.1266) ( 0.1721) ( 0.2792) 
All Officers and Directors (%) 18.92 11.90 21.48 20.50 11.09 22.19 -1.11 
( 0.7529) ( 0.2641) ( 0.7769) 
All Officers and Directors (#) 12.00 11.00 4.70 11.10 10.50 5.12 0.85 
( 0.3063) ( 0.2495) ( 0.4315) 
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Table 4 performs regression analysis using the 5 ownership concentration variables 
identified above as the dependent variables.  Size, leverage, and state-level income per capita are 
used as explanatory variables.   
ℎ		 =  + 	 +  +  ! 
																																																																															+	"#/	 + % 
where LA Dummy is whether a firm is a Louisiana firm or not, Size is the log of total assets, and 
Leverage is debt (short term + long term) / total assets, and Income/Capita is the state-level 
income per capita.  Size and Leverage both come from Compustat.  The income per capita comes 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Size is found to be inversely related to ownership 
concentration as in Holderness (2009).  The state-level income per capita is used in an effort to 
control for the home bias complication discussed previously.  Size is found to be a statistically 
significant determinant of most all ownership concentration measures.  Again, this is most true 
for the subset of Louisiana incorporated firms (Panel B).  This lends support to the argument that 
firm size should be controlled for when analyzing ownership concentration.  As in the univariate 
analysis, the LA Dummy variable (1 if in Louisiana) is significant in determining largest 
blockholder percent ownership as well as all directors and officers as a group percent ownership.  
Being incorporated in Louisiana increases the percent ownership of both of these variables by 
almost 9%. 
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Table 4.  Ownership Concentration Regression 
 
This table shows the results from OLS regressions.  The 5 different dependent variables are the 
ownership concentration variables of interest.  LA Dummy is 1 for Louisiana firms, 0 otherwise.  
Size is log of total assets and Leverage is debt (short term + long term) / total assets – both from 
Compustat.  Income/Capita is the state-level income per capita from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.  Panel A shows the full sample, while Panels B & C break down the sample into 
incorporated and located in Louisiana respectively.  Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses.  ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively (two-tailed). 
 
Panel A: All Louisiana Firms 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Largest 
Blockholder 
All 
Blockholders 
(%) 
All 
Blockholders 
(#) 
All Officers 
and Directors 
(%) 
All Officers 
and Directors 
(#) 
      
LA Dummy 6.280** 1.807 -0.280 4.852 0.786 
 (2.658) (3.562) (0.265) (2.944) (0.820) 
Size -1.925*** -3.110*** -0.054 -4.049*** 1.720*** 
 (0.661) (0.945) (0.058) (0.812) (0.186) 
Leverage 8.429 15.065** 0.157 -4.264 -0.963 
 (5.230) (7.238) (0.453) (5.909) (1.270) 
Income/Capita -0.308 -0.226 0.037** -0.109 -0.071 
 (0.202) (0.263) (0.018) (0.186) (0.061) 
Constant 35.748*** 58.697*** 2.227*** 45.303*** 4.832*** 
 (5.145) (7.863) (0.545) (6.150) (1.724) 
      
Observations 176 176 176 176 176 
R-squared 0.176 0.175 0.035 0.202 0.405 
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Table 4.  Ownership Concentration Regression (continued) 
 
Panel B: Firms Incorporated in Louisiana 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Largest 
Blockholder 
All 
Blockholders 
(%) 
All 
Blockholders 
(#) 
All Officers 
and Directors 
(%) 
All Officers 
and Directors 
(#) 
      
LA Dummy 8.720** 6.832 -0.065 8.991** 1.183 
 (3.609) (4.894) (0.340) (4.345) (1.319) 
Size -1.424* -2.581** -0.065 -2.305** 1.815*** 
 (0.739) (1.145) (0.070) (0.961) (0.286) 
Leverage 17.519*** 23.528*** -0.188 -0.532 -1.362 
 (6.331) (8.726) (0.573) (8.733) (2.207) 
Income/Capita -0.181 -0.131 0.035 -0.376 -0.047 
 (0.200) (0.294) (0.022) (0.241) (0.088) 
Constant 23.500*** 43.475*** 2.061*** 41.250*** 3.958 
 (6.930) (11.462) (0.713) (9.195) (2.971) 
      
Observations 94 94 94 94 94 
R-squared 0.219 0.197 0.034 0.134 0.363 
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Table 4.  Ownership Concentration Regression (continued) 
 
Panel C: Firms Located in Louisiana 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Largest 
Blockholder 
All 
Blockholders 
(%) 
All 
Blockholders 
(#) 
All Officers 
and Directors 
(%) 
All Officers 
and Directors 
(#) 
      
LA Dummy 4.127 -3.961 -0.637 1.220 0.266 
 (4.000) (5.040) (0.428) (3.798) (0.779) 
Size -1.843 -2.700* -0.017 -7.041*** 1.588*** 
 (1.294) (1.560) (0.094) (1.164) (0.194) 
Leverage 0.604 8.456 0.721 -5.493 -0.135 
 (6.369) (10.052) (0.532) (6.246) (0.722) 
Income/Capita -0.577 -0.519 0.037 0.637** -0.084 
 (0.452) (0.501) (0.032) (0.251) (0.066) 
Constant 48.850*** 75.435*** 2.392*** 40.181*** 5.398*** 
 (8.981) (11.261) (0.830) (6.608) (1.590) 
      
Observations 82 82 82 82 82 
R-squared 0.194 0.199 0.063 0.446 0.542 
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5. Robustness Checks 
Tables 5-8 are identical to Tables 1-4 except for the control group matches.  In these 
tables, for the control group, 2 matches for each sample firm was obtained – one smaller and one 
larger than the sample total assets.  Each data point in the two matches was averaged together to 
obtain the hybrid firm (non-Louisiana) set.  No meaningful differences are found.4 
Many companies choose to incorporate in Delaware.  The reasons for this decision and its 
effects are investigated in a wide range of literature (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2002, 
Subramanian, 2002, Greenfield, 2004, and Dammann and Schundeln, 2008).  Tables 9-12 
account for this incorporation choice by matching firms that are incorporated in Louisiana 
specifically to firms that are incorporated in Delaware (Panel A’s) and matching to firms not 
incorporated in Delaware (Panel B’s).  Tables 9-12 are otherwise similar to Tables 1-4.  Most 
results are not meaningfully different.  However, the largest blockholder percent holdings and all 
officers and directors as a group holdings becomes less pronounced and significant for the 
Delaware matches.  The difference for these items is remains significant for the non-Delaware 
matches.  This holds true for both the univariate (Table 11) and multivariate (Table 12) analysis. 
  
                              
4
 Results using only the second closest match are similar. 
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Table 5.  Descriptive Statistics – Hybrid Firm Matches 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the 88 firms either incorporated or located in Louisiana and 
their Non-Louisiana matches.  Matching is based on the same 3 digit SIC code and the next two closest in 
total assets are averaged to form a hybrid firm.  Panel B provides an Industry breakdown for the sample.  
Data is from Compustat.  Total Assets, Market Value, and Sales are in $ millions.  Leverage is debt (short 
term + long term) / total assets.  Panels C & D only include the 47 firms incorporated in Louisiana while 
Panels E & F only include the 41 firms located in Louisiana.  ***, **, * indicates t-test of means 
statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). ###, ##, # indicates 
Wilcoxon test statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
Panel A: All Louisiana Firms 
  Louisiana (N =  88 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N =  88 hybrids) 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean   Median   
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Assets 1,752.56 304.22 4,924.28 1,836.47 335.73 4,987.65 
Market Value 695.51 87.72 1,837.88 772.71 194.99 + 1,713.70 
Leverage 0.40 0.29 0.46 0.29 * 0.23 0.26 
Sales 580.63 184.80 1,414.37 723.21 175.47 1,644.99 
                    
  
Panel B: Industry Distribution – Full Sample 
Industry (Two-digit SIC Codes) 
Number 
of Firms Percentage 
Construction (15-17) 2 2% 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (60-67) 20 23% 
Manufacturing (20-39) 15 17% 
Mining (10-14) 19 22% 
Public Administration (91-99) 2 2% 
Retail Trade (52-59) 6 7% 
Services (70-89) 12 14% 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services (40-49) 9 10% 
Wholesale Trade (50-51) 3 3% 
  88 100% 
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Table 5.  Descriptive Statistics – Hybrid Firm Matches (continued) 
Panel C: Firms Incorporated in Louisiana  
  Louisiana (N =  47 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N =  47 hybrids) 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean   Median   
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Assets  1,861.50       265.87    4,076.19   1,914.64       331.94    4,125.38  
Market Value     502.63         84.38       962.86      648.18       175.59    1,389.51  
Leverage         0.37           0.23           0.48          0.34           0.23           0.33  
Sales     489.77       123.08    1,125.23      546.41       140.63    1,148.22  
                    
 
Panel D: Industry Distribution – Incorporated in Louisiana 
Industry (Two-digit SIC Codes) 
Number of 
Firms Percentage 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (60-67) 18 38% 
Manufacturing (20-39) 6 13% 
Mining (10-14) 5 11% 
Public Administration (91-99) 1 2% 
Retail Trade (52-59) 5 11% 
Services (70-89) 6 13% 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services (40-49) 6 13% 
  47 100% 
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Table 5.  Descriptive Statistics – Hybrid Firms Matches (continued)  
Panel E: Firms Located in Louisiana  
  Louisiana (N =  41 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N =  41 hybrids) 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean   Median   
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Assets 1,627.68  306.23  5,796.81  1,746.85  394.91  5,875.35  
Market Value 907.20  267.58  2,463.78  915.46  392.47  2,031.76  
Leverage 0.43  0.34  0.44  0.24  **  0.23  ##  0.14  
Sales 684.79  238.08  1,695.30  926.54  250.56  2,072.95  
                    
 
Panel F: Industry Distribution – Located in Louisiana 
Industry (Two-digit SIC Codes) 
Number of 
Firms Percentage 
Construction (15-17) 2 5% 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (60-67) 2 5% 
Manufacturing (20-39) 9 22% 
Mining (10-14) 14 34% 
Public Administration (91-99) 1 2% 
Retail Trade (52-59) 1 2% 
Services (70-89) 6 15% 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services (40-49) 3 7% 
Wholesale Trade (50-51) 3 7% 
  41 100% 
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Table 6.  Comparison of Concentration of Ownership – Hybrid Firm Matches 
This table shows mean, median, and standard deviation comparisons between Louisiana and Non-
Louisiana hybrid firms for the 9 hand-collected ownership concentration variables from SEC filings.  
Panel A shows the full sample, while Panels B & C break down the sample into incorporated and located 
in Louisiana respectively.  Blockholders are shareholders controlling greater than 5% voting rights.  
Largest shareholder is contingent on controlling greater than 5%, otherwise 0% is used. 
Panel A: All Louisiana Firms 
  Louisiana (N = 88 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N = 88 hybrids) 
Variable N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Largest blockholder 82 25.69 15.40 22.46 87 22.53 18.50 12.89 
Second largest blockholder 65 10.56 8.70 6.43 83 11.42 9.60 5.83 
Third largest blockholder 44 7.70 7.50 2.36 71 9.11 8.00 3.72 
All blockholders (%) 81 42.13 38.10 26.03 87 41.93 40.19 18.47 
All blockholders (#) 88 2.76 2.50 1.60 87 3.69 2.50 6.47 
All Officers and Directors (%) 88 22.97 15.70 24.59 88 21.13 18.18 17.31 
All Officers and Directors (#) 88 12.70 11.00 6.97 88 12.31 11.25 5.45 
CEO blockholders (%) 30 26.36 13.85 25.76 46 25.73 18.34 20.18 
Chair blockholders (%) 35 28.91 16.37 25.06 51 25.96 19.95 19.39 
CEO = Largest blockholder 14 18 
Chair = Largest blockholder 23 22 
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Table 6.  Comparison of Concentration of Ownership – Hybrid Firm Matches (continued) 
Panel B: Firms Incorporated in Louisiana  
  Louisiana (N = 47 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N = 47 hybrids) 
Variable N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Largest blockholder 43 25.02 12.60 23.35 47 19.85 16.65 10.31 
Second largest blockholder 32 10.18 9.12 5.35 43 11.30 9.70 5.76 
Third largest blockholder 21 7.29 7.00 2.05 35 9.33 8.60 3.07 
All Blockholders (%) 43 40.13 33.80 26.50 47 35.74 38.35 16.47 
All Blockholders (#) 47 2.57 2.00 1.58 47 2.81 2.50 1.34 
All Officers and Directors (%) 47 26.51 18.17 26.74 47 18.65 16.61 13.85 
All Officers and Directors (#) 47 13.32 11.00 8.48 47 12.57 12.00 6.12 
CEO Blockholders (%) 13 29.18 10.45 30.06 22 19.79 16.15 14.50 
Chair Blockholders (%) 17 32.62 30.50 28.04 24 20.45 16.43 14.29 
CEO = Largest blockholder 6 8 
Chair = Largest blockholder 13 11 
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Table 6.  Comparison of Concentration of Ownership – Hybrid Firm Matches (continued) 
Panel C: Firms Located in Louisiana  
  Louisiana (N = 41 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N = 41 hybrids) 
Variable N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Largest blockholder 39 26.42 16.37 21.71 40 25.69 20.38 14.91 
Second largest blockholder 33 10.93 8.54 7.39 40 11.54 9.45 5.98 
Third largest blockholder 23 8.08 7.60 2.60 36 8.91 7.48 4.29 
All Blockholders (%) 38 44.40 41.37 25.65 40 49.20 50.85 18.22 
All Blockholders (#) 41 2.98 3.00 1.62 40 4.72 3.00 9.39 
All Officers and Directors (%) 41 18.92 11.90 21.48 41 23.98 20.40 20.39 
All Officers and Directors (#) 41 12.00 11.00 4.70 41 12.01 11.00 4.63 
CEO Blockholders (%) 17 24.21 14.70 22.66 24 31.17 26.32 23.25 
Chair Blockholders (%) 18 25.41 15.65 22.12 27 30.87 24.78 22.13 
CEO = Largest blockholder 8 10 
Chair = Largest blockholder 10 11 
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Table 7.  Univariate Tests – Hybrid Firm Matches 
This table displays the results of univariate tests comparing concentration of ownership variables of interest.  Panel A shows the full sample, while 
Panels B & C break down the sample into incorporated and located in Louisiana respectively.  A t-test, non-parametric medians test and Wilcoxon 
test is performed to check for differences in the means and medians.  ***, **, * indicates t-test of means statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively (two-tailed). +++, ++, + indicates non-parametric medians test statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively (two-tailed). ###, ##, # indicates Wilcoxon test statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
Panel A: All Louisiana Firms 
  Louisiana (N =  88 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N =  88 firms)   Differences 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean t-test 
non-
parametric 
medians 
test 
Wilcoxon 
test 
Largest blockholder 25.69 15.40 22.46 22.53 18.50 12.89 2.86 
( 0.299) (0.911) ( 0.355) 
All Blockholders (%) 42.13 38.10 26.03 41.93 40.19 18.47 0.58 
( 0.839) ( 0.761) ( 0.636) 
All Blockholders (#) 2.76 2.50 1.60 3.69 2.50 6.47 -0.95 
( 0.184) ( 0.154) ( 0.232) 
All Officers and Directors (%) 22.97 15.70 24.59 21.13 18.18 17.31 1.84 
( 0.506) ( 0.843) ( 0.489) 
All Officers and Directors (#) 12.70 11.00 6.97 12.31 11.25 5.45 0.39 
( 0.582) (0.928) ( 0.875) 
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Table 7.  Univariate Tests – Hybrid Firm Matches (continued) 
Panel B: Firms Incorporated in Louisiana 
  Louisiana (N =  47 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N =  47 firms)   Differences 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean t-test 
non-
parametric 
medians 
test 
Wilcoxon 
test 
Largest blockholder 25.02 12.60 23.35 19.85 16.65 10.31 4.66 
( 0.231) ( 0.552) ( 0.502) 
All Blockholders (%) 40.13 33.80 26.50 35.74 38.35 16.47 4.06 
( 0.335) ( 0.584) ( 0.890) 
All Blockholders (#) 2.57 2.00 1.58 2.81 2.50 1.34 -0.24 
( 0.530) ( 0.876) ( 0.406) 
All Officers and Directors (%) 26.51 18.17 26.74 18.65 16.61 13.85 7.86 ** 
( 0.049) ( 0.140) ( 0.451) 
All Officers and Directors (#) 13.32 11.00 8.48 12.57 12.00 6.12 0.74 
( 0.530) (0.876) ( 0.918) 
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Table 7.  Univariate Tests – Hybrid Firm Matches (continued) 
Panel C: Firms Located in Louisiana 
  Louisiana (N =  41 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N =  41 firms)   Differences 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean t-test 
non-
parametric 
medians 
test 
Wilcoxon 
test 
Largest blockholder 26.42 16.37 21.71 25.69 20.38 14.91 0.82 
( 0.835) ( 0.489) ( 0.441) 
All Blockholders (%) 44.40 41.37 25.65 49.20 50.85 18.22 -3.47 
( 0.360) ( 0.329) ( 0.360) 
All Blockholders (#) 2.98 3.00 1.62 4.72 3.00 9.39 -1.80 
( 0.244) ( 0.282) ( 0.348) 
All Officers and Directors (%) 18.92 11.90 21.48 23.98 20.40 20.39 -5.06 + * 
( 0.175) ( 0.054) ( 0.084) 
All Officers and Directors (#) 12.00 11.00 4.70 12.01 11.00 4.63 -0.01 
( 0.986) ( 0.807) ( 0.896) 
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Table 8.  Ownership Concentration Regression on Hybrid Matches 
 
This table shows the results from OLS regressions.  The 5 different dependent variables are the ownership concentration variables of interest.  LA 
Dummy is 1 for Louisiana firms, 0 otherwise.  Size is log of total assets and Leverage is debt (short term + long term) / total assets – both from 
Compustat.  Income/Capita is the state-level income per capita from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Panel A shows the full sample, while 
Panels B & C break down the sample into incorporated and located in Louisiana respectively.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
Panel A: All Louisiana Firms 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Largest Blockholder All Blockholders (%) All Blockholders (#) All Officers and Directors (%) All Officers and Directors (#) 
      
LA Dummy 1.742 -1.537 -1.215 1.328 0.320 
 (2.487) (3.152) (1.039) (2.804) (0.708) 
Size -2.389*** -2.853*** 0.187 -3.901*** 1.680*** 
 (0.648) (0.799) (0.178) (0.809) (0.172) 
Leverage 4.319 8.405 0.675 -4.482 -0.755 
 (4.713) (6.126) (0.675) (5.421) (1.129) 
Income/Capita -0.206 -0.299 -0.064 -0.075 -0.090 
 (0.180) (0.215) (0.087) (0.169) (0.055) 
Constant 41.450*** 65.262*** 4.539* 47.154*** 5.960*** 
 (5.769) (7.427) (2.363) (5.986) (1.785) 
      
Observations 176 176 176 176 176 
R-squared 0.140 0.154 0.026 0.180 0.402 
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Table 8.  Ownership Concentration Regression on Hybrid Matches (continued) 
 
Panel B: Firms Incorporated in Louisiana 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Largest Blockholder All Blockholders (%) All Blockholders (#) All Officers and Directors (%) All Officers and Directors (#) 
      
LA Dummy 4.712 3.415 -0.176 6.527 0.962 
 (3.510) (4.372) (0.304) (3.996) (1.117) 
Size -1.565** -2.062** 0.025 -2.442*** 1.748*** 
 (0.769) (1.017) (0.068) (0.894) (0.272) 
Leverage 9.842 13.219 0.008 -1.100 -0.857 
 (6.388) (8.237) (0.456) (7.535) (1.772) 
Income/Capita -0.048 -0.166 0.015 -0.228 -0.049 
 (0.216) (0.268) (0.019) (0.221) (0.078) 
Constant 27.100*** 48.529*** 2.183*** 40.448*** 4.415 
 (7.856) (10.053) (0.656) (8.176) (3.033) 
      
Observations 94 94 94 94 94 
R-squared 0.116 0.128 0.017 0.119 0.352 
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Table 8.  Ownership Concentration Regression (continued) 
 
Panel C: Firms Located in Louisiana 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Largest Blockholder All Blockholders (%) All Blockholders (#) All Officers and Directors (%) All Officers and Directors (#) 
      
LA Dummy -0.716 -6.719 -2.707 -4.337 -0.480 
 (3.730) (4.192) (2.376) (4.118) (0.709) 
Size -2.880*** -3.209*** 0.566 -6.037*** 1.644*** 
 (1.016) (1.011) (0.559) (1.225) (0.174) 
Leverage -1.389 5.229 1.667 -3.625 -0.411 
 (6.919) (9.350) (1.382) (7.066) (0.711) 
Income/Capita -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 55.458*** 80.691*** 7.766 47.522*** 7.615*** 
 (9.038) (9.885) (5.533) (8.323) (1.678) 
      
Observations 82 82 82 82 82 
R-squared 0.221 0.238 0.075 0.379 0.587 
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Table 9.  Descriptive Statistics – Delaware and Non-Delaware Matches 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the 47 firms incorporated in Louisiana and their incorporated in 
Delaware matches.  Matching is based on the same 3 digit SIC code and then closest in total assets.  Panel 
B presents descriptive statistics for matches not incorporated in Delaware (or Louisiana).  Data is from 
Compustat.  Total Assets, Market Value, and Sales are in $ millions.  Leverage is debt (short term + long 
term) / total assets.  ***, **, * indicates t-test of means statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively (two-tailed). ###, ##, # indicates Wilcoxon test statistically different at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
Panel A: Firms Incorporated in Louisiana Matched to Firms Incorporated in Delaware 
  Louisiana (N =  47 firms)   Delaware (N =  47 firms) 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean   Median   
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Assets  1,861.50       265.87    4,076.19   1,752.96       321.39    3,705.71  
Market Value     502.63         84.38       962.86      491.00       102.88       988.21  
Leverage         0.37           0.23           0.48          0.31           0.24           0.25  
Sales     489.77       123.08    1,125.23      433.85       121.53       964.15  
                    
  
Panel B: Firms Incorporated in Louisiana Matched to Firms Not Incorporated in Delaware 
  Louisiana (N =  47 firms)   Non-Delaware (N =  47 firms) 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean   Median   
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Assets  1,861.50       265.87    4,076.19   1,948.65       250.50    4,470.24  
Market Value     502.63         84.38       962.86      693.46         92.87    1,679.05  
Leverage         0.37           0.23           0.48          0.37           0.27           0.57  
Sales     489.77       123.08    1,125.23      562.33         78.01    1,577.93  
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Table 10. Comparison of Concentration of Ownership – Delaware and Non-Delaware Matches 
This table shows mean, median, and standard deviation comparisons between Louisiana and Delaware 
(Panel A) and Louisiana and Non-Delaware (Panel B)  firms for the 9 hand-collected ownership 
concentration variables from SEC filings.  Blockholders are shareholders controlling greater than 5% 
voting rights.  Largest shareholder is contingent on controlling greater than 5%, otherwise 0% is used. 
Panel A: Firms Incorporated in Louisiana Matched to Firms Incorporated in Delaware 
  Louisiana (N = 47 firms)   Delaware (N = 47 firms) 
Variable N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Largest blockholder 43 25.02 12.60 23.35 46 18.45 14.13 14.74 
Second largest blockholder 32 10.18 9.12 5.35 34 11.12 9.20 7.01 
Third largest blockholder 21 7.29 7.00 2.05 21 9.43 9.02 2.91 
All Blockholders (%) 43 40.13 33.80 26.50 46 34.76 34.59 24.75 
All Blockholders (#) 47 2.57 2.00 1.58 47 2.67 2.00 1.86 
All Officers and Directors (%) 47 26.51 18.17 26.74 47 18.88 12.55 18.49 
All Officers and Directors (#) 47 13.32 11.00 8.48 47 12.30 11.00 6.08 
CEO Blockholders (%) 13 29.18 10.45 30.06 11 20.81 17.00 13.69 
Chair Blockholders (%) 17 32.62 30.50 28.04 13 23.02 19.75 14.19 
CEO = Largest blockholder 6 11 
Chair = Largest blockholder 13 13 
                    
 
Panel B: Firms Incorporated in Louisiana Matched to Firms Not Incorporated in Delaware 
  Louisiana (N = 47 firms)   Non-Delaware (N = 47 firms) 
Variable N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Largest blockholder 43 25.02 12.60 23.35 44 15.37 11.25 11.72 
Second largest blockholder 32 10.18 9.12 5.35 30 11.72 9.30 6.31 
Third largest blockholder 21 7.29 7.00 2.05 17 10.18 8.70 4.82 
All Blockholders (%) 43 40.13 33.80 26.50 44 31.11 21.50 25.42 
All Blockholders (#) 47 2.57 2.00 1.58 47 2.43 2.00 1.76 
All Officers and Directors (%) 47 26.51 18.17 26.74 47 18.91 12.52 17.61 
All Officers and Directors (#) 47 13.32 11.00 8.48 47 12.30 11.50 6.76 
CEO Blockholders (%) 13 29.18 10.45 30.06 14 18.77 10.40 16.04 
Chair Blockholders (%) 17 32.62 30.50 28.04 16 18.70 12.05 15.26 
CEO = Largest blockholder 6 14 
Chair = Largest blockholder 13 16 
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Table 11.  Univariate Tests – Delaware and Non-Delaware Matches  
This table displays the results of univariate tests comparing concentration of ownership variables of interest.  Panel A shows the Delaware 
matches, while Panels B shows the non-Delaware matches.  A t-test, non-parametric medians test and Wilcoxon test is performed to check for 
differences in the means and medians.  ***, **, * indicates t-test of means statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-
tailed). +++, ++, + indicates non-parametric medians test statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). ###, ##, # 
indicates Wilcoxon test statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
Panel A: Firms Incorporated in Louisiana Matched with Firms Incorporated in Delaware 
  Louisiana (N =  47 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N =  47 firms)   Differences 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean t-test 
non-
parametric 
medians 
test 
Wilcoxon 
test 
Largest blockholder 25.02 12.60 23.35 18.45 14.13 14.74 6.57 
( 0.135) ( 0.143) ( 0.613) 
All Blockholders (%) 40.13 33.80 26.50 34.76 34.59 24.75 5.38 
( 0.243) ( 0.247) ( 0.401) 
All Blockholders (#) 2.57 2.00 1.58 2.67 2.00 1.86 -0.09 
( 0.799) ( 0.885) ( 0.990) 
All Officers and Directors (%) 26.51 18.17 26.74 18.88 12.55 18.49 7.08 * + 
( 0.098) ( 0.118) ( 0.249) 
All Officers and Directors (#) 13.32 11.00 8.48 12.30 11.00 6.08 1.07 
( 0.343) ( 0.331) ( 0.745) 
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Table 11.  Univariate Tests – Delaware and Non-Delaware Matches (continued) 
Panel B: Firms Incorporated in Louisiana Matched with Firms Not Incorporated in Delaware 
  Louisiana (N =  47 firms)   Non-Louisiana (N =  47 firms)   Differences 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean t-test 
non-
parametric 
medians 
test 
Wilcoxon 
test 
Largest blockholder 25.02 12.60 23.35 15.37 11.25 11.72 7.51 ** + 
( 0.022) ( 0.048) ( 0.139) 
All Blockholders (%) 40.13 33.80 26.50 31.11 21.50 25.42 6.41 # 
( 0.188) ( 0.205) ( 0.065) 
All Blockholders (#) 2.57 2.00 1.58 2.43 2.00 1.76 0.13 
( 0.671) ( 0.898) ( 0.568) 
All Officers and Directors (%) 26.51 18.17 26.74 18.91 12.52 17.61 8.10 * 
( 0.060) ( 0.173) ( 0.183) 
All Officers and Directors (#) 13.32 11.00 8.48 12.30 11.50 6.76 0.93 
( 0.439) ( 0.518) ( 0.689) 
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Table 12.  Ownership Concentration Regression  
 
This table shows the results from OLS regressions.  The 5 different dependent variables are the ownership concentration variables of interest.  LA 
Dummy is 1 for Louisiana firms, 0 otherwise.  Size is log of total assets and Leverage is debt (short term + long term) / total assets – both from 
Compustat.  Income/Capita is the state-level income per capita from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Panel A shows the Delaware matches, 
while Panels B shows the non-Delaware matches.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
Panel A: LA – Delaware Matches 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Largest Blockholder All Blockholders (%) All Blockholders (#) All Officers and Directors (%) All Officers and Directors (#) 
      
LA Dummy 6.848* 5.193 0.039 7.217 0.587 
 (3.633) (5.004) (0.351) (4.565) (1.111) 
Size -1.853** -3.207*** -0.131* -3.106*** 1.998*** 
 (0.737) (1.152) (0.078) (0.832) (0.257) 
Leverage 16.902** 26.103*** -0.006*** -0.080*** 0.015*** 
 (6.463) (9.547) (0.001) (0.015) (0.004) 
Income/Capita 0.173 0.183 0.012 -0.138 -0.096 
 (0.226) (0.263) (0.019) (0.227) (0.082) 
Constant 17.935** 38.759*** 3.028*** 41.247*** 4.170 
 (8.562) (11.581) (0.713) (8.927) (2.758) 
      
Observations 94 94 94 94 94 
R-squared 0.155 0.201 0.054 0.123 0.359 
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Table 12.  Ownership Concentration Regression (continued) 
 
Panel B: LA – Non-Delaware Matches 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Largest Blockholder All Blockholders (%) All Blockholders (#) All Officers and Directors (%) All Officers and Directors (#) 
      
LA Dummy 9.793*** 9.616* 0.371 9.001** 0.451 
 (3.574) (5.356) (0.353) (4.299) (1.198) 
Size -2.139** -3.857*** -0.152** -3.834*** 1.981*** 
 (0.834) (1.269) (0.065) (0.951) (0.287) 
Leverage 2.893 2.442 -0.006*** -0.092*** 0.015*** 
 (5.149) (7.468) (0.001) (0.016) (0.004) 
Income/Capita -0.101 -0.037 0.034* -0.141 -0.076 
 (0.241) (0.321) (0.020) (0.226) (0.084) 
Constant 29.355*** 52.462*** 2.145*** 44.426*** 3.875 
 (8.289) (13.215) (0.748) (8.918) (2.846) 
      
Observations 94 94 94 94 94 
R-squared 0.151 0.152 0.095 0.189 0.358 
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Since the tests reported in the previous section examine ownership concentration for 
Louisiana and non-Louisiana firms without conditioning on the incorporation decision: I next 
model firms’ incorporation decision.  Firms are able to endogenously determine where to 
incorporate.  The concern is this incorporation choice is non-random and correlated with location 
of headquarters, size, and how recent the firm’s initial public offering is.  Firms may choose their 
state of incorporation based on many factors, including the fact that the chosen state of 
incorporation determines what legal structure the firm is subject to.  Failing to account for this 
self-selection can result in potentially biased estimates of coefficients and standard errors.   
To mitigate this potential self-selection bias, I follow a variant of Heckman’s (1979) two-
stage model.  As noted above, Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) find that location has a substantial 
influence on the incorporation decision, commonly referred to as home bias.  This home bias is 
weaker for both larger companies and for companies that have incorporated more recently.  
Several other factors are offered as possible determinants of the incorporation choice, which I 
use in the first stage of my Heckman regression analysis.  In the first stage, I estimate a probit 
regression using the factors identified in Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) for determining whether a 
firm incorporates in their home state.  The model is: 
	#	 = 	& + &' +    
where LA Incorp is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm incorporates in Louisiana, and zero 
otherwise, and Z is a vector of covariates representing factors hypothesized to explain the 
incorporation decision.  These factors are a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is located in 
Louisiana, log of sales, Tobin’s Q, return on assets, number of employees, total equity, and a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO occurs after 1990.   
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     In the second stage, I estimate my main regressions but include the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR) 
constructed from the first stage regression.  The IMR is the probability that a firm incorporates in 
the state that it is headquartered.  In the second stage of the procedure I use ordinary least 
squares to estimate the following augmented ownership regression: 
ℎ		 =  + 	 +  +  ! 
																																																																															+	"#/	 + (#)* + %  
 
where variables are as previously defined and IMR is the inverse Mill’s ratio calculated from the 
first stage. 
 The results of the first stage probit regression (untabulated) indicate that the model has a 
pseudo R squared of 26%.  The regression also confirms a significant a positive coefficient for 
home bias – i.e. firms located in Louisiana tend to incorporate there.  Also firms that have their 
initial public offering after 1990 are much less likely to incorporate in Louisiana.   
 The results for the second stage regression are in Table 13.  For this Heckman model firm 
size is the only significant variable for determining ownership concentration.  It appears that the 
results in the previous section might be sensitive to controlling for self selection. 
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Table 13.  Ownership Concentration Heckman Regression 
 
This table shows the results from the Heckman regressions that adjust for self-selection bias due to firms’ incorporation decisions.  The 5 different 
dependent variables are the ownership concentration variables of interest.  LA Dummy is 1 for Louisiana firms, 0 otherwise.  Size is log of total 
assets and Leverage is debt (short term + long term) / total assets – both from Compustat.  Income/Capita is the state-level income per capita from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  IMR is the inverse Mill’s ratio calculated from a first-stage probit regression that predicts whether firms 
incorporate in Louisiana based on whether firms are located in Louisiana, log of sales, Tobin’s Q, return on assets, the number of employees, total 
equity, and whether firms’ went public after 1990.  Panel A shows the full sample, while Panels B & C break down the sample into incorporated 
and located in Louisiana respectively.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
  
Panel A: All Louisiana Firms 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Largest Blockholder All Blockholders (%) All Blockholders (#) All Officers and Directors (%) All Officers and Directors (#) 
      
LA Dummy 3.619 -5.381 -0.585 5.753 -2.795** 
 (6.095) (7.664) (0.462) (7.447) (1.292) 
Size -2.075*** -3.617*** -0.089 -4.817*** 1.768*** 
 (0.630) (0.971) (0.057) (0.814) (0.184) 
Leverage 6.616 16.690** 1.017** 5.150 -1.353 
 (4.888) (8.247) (0.441) (7.514) (1.099) 
Income/Capita -0.161 0.088 0.051*** 0.136 -0.031 
 (0.197) (0.262) (0.016) (0.194) (0.049) 
IMR -0.258 -4.872 -0.494 1.340 -2.616*** 
 (4.807) (6.144) (0.316) (6.145) (0.918) 
Constant 34.087*** 62.018*** 2.602*** 36.926*** 9.074*** 
 (10.718) (14.220) (0.852) (12.451) (2.134) 
      
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 
R-squared 0.142 0.187 0.095 0.293 0.522 
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Table 13.  Ownership Concentration Heckman Regression (continued) 
 
Panel B: Firms Incorporated in Louisiana 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Largest Blockholder All Blockholders (%) All Blockholders (#) All Officers and Directors (%) All Officers and Directors (#) 
      
LA Dummy 10.888 5.762 -0.233 9.942 -3.396* 
 (8.669) (9.846) (0.523) (9.978) (1.824) 
Size -1.282* -2.822** -0.122* -3.244*** 1.915*** 
 (0.740) (1.210) (0.068) (0.949) (0.270) 
Leverage 15.974** 26.235** 0.908 15.289* -3.282* 
 (7.841) (10.309) (0.641) (8.008) (1.779) 
Income/Capita -0.067 0.158 0.046** -0.033 -0.007 
 (0.186) (0.275) (0.020) (0.231) (0.062) 
IMR 3.921 0.549 -0.391 2.911 -2.963** 
 (6.054) (7.281) (0.324) (7.290) (1.177) 
Constant 11.745 33.889 2.374** 26.253 9.315*** 
 (15.768) (20.582) (1.108) (19.427) (3.397) 
      
Observations 82 82 82 82 82 
R-squared 0.166 0.184 0.108 0.231 0.540 
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Table 13.  Ownership Concentration Heckman Regression (continued) 
 
Panel C: Firms Located in Louisiana 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Largest Blockholder All Blockholders (%) All Blockholders (#) All Officers and Directors (%) All Officers and Directors (#) 
      
LA Dummy -2.123 -13.057 -0.823 3.247 -1.887 
 (6.794) (11.134) (0.936) (10.031) (1.855) 
Size -2.413** -3.590** -0.015 -7.228*** 1.567*** 
 (1.181) (1.598) (0.097) (1.244) (0.188) 
Leverage 0.684 11.097 1.186* -2.124 -0.058 
 (4.731) (10.468) (0.655) (9.431) (0.812) 
Income/Capita -0.225 -0.048 0.047 0.730** -0.056 
 (0.431) (0.549) (0.034) (0.316) (0.070) 
IMR -4.261 -7.394 -0.383 -0.959 -1.847 
 (6.066) (9.557) (0.759) (9.098) (1.569) 
Constant 50.602*** 80.656*** 2.553* 37.308** 8.494*** 
 (16.190) (20.544) (1.489) (14.599) (2.628) 
      
Observations 74 74 74 74 74 
R-squared 0.181 0.231 0.090 0.470 0.533 
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6. Conclusion 
 In summary, I find statistically significant differences in concentration of ownership 
when comparing Louisiana-based firms to similar US firms from outside Louisiana.  As expected 
this is stronger when comparing only the Louisiana incorporated firms to non-Louisiana 
incorporated firms.  Additionally, if the non-Louisiana firms are limited to non-Delaware firms 
the significance of my result is strengthened further.  These findings are in line with previous 
studies in the Canadian environment, most notably Attig (2005) and Bozec, Rousseau, and 
Laurin (2008), do find statistically significant differences in concentration of ownership when 
comparing Quebec-based firms to similar Canadian firms from outside Quebec.  Using the 
matching firm methodology I am able to control for size, a common criticism of LLSV.  
Language, culture, and religious differences are also posited as omitted variable in other studies.  
Since Louisiana is similar to all the other states in these areas, my result cannot be attributed to 
these factors.  Further, the attribution of the findings in cross-country studies, like LLSV, is 
criticized because the countries fall under different regulators.  Since the SEC regulates all the 
U.S. the attribution of my results do not suffer this concern.  My results strengthen the position 
that firms operating in a civil law origin legal environment, where investor protections are 
weaker, compensate with a higher concentration of ownership.   
To reiterate, the results in this literature is subject to common caveats.  First, “law and 
finance” papers attribute the source of identified differences to legal origin, which precedes other 
subsequent corporate governance choices.  However, one cannot rule out that legal origin also 
affects other corporate governance choices that are codetermined with ownership structure.  This 
is similar in spirit to having omitted correlated variables.  For example, in prior studies using 
59 
 
 
       
Quebec as a setting – including Attig (2005) and Bozec, Rousseau, and Laurin (2008) – both 
language and legal origin vary simultaneously.  Even though all public Canadian firms are 
required to provide their financial statement information in both French and English, it is 
possible that Quebec investors are more comfortable with Quebec based firms.  Since I 
document the same variation in Louisiana, my study would suggest that differences in dispersion 
of ownership are not exclusively due to language barriers.  Nevertheless, I cannot rule out that 
differences in say religious background between LA and the rest of the US could explain my 
results.   
There are natural extensions of the research presented in this dissertation.  First, as argued 
in the Appendix, Puerto Rico might be an alternative region within the US with civil law origin.  
In addition, other countries offer variation in legal origin.  For example, Switzerland has four 
different languages across its cantons: French, German, Italian and Romansh.  While all of 
Switzerland has civil law, the German speaking cantons have closer ties with German legal 
origin than the remaining cantons which are more like French in their legal origin.  Similarly, 
Belgium is a country with French legal origin where half speaks Dutch and the other half speaks 
French.  Similar to Quebec within Canada, in both these settings, any investigation of 
differences, if any, due to legal origin are inseparable from differences in language which can 
render clean inferences and attribution difficult.  Nevertheless, if language is associated with 
transaction costs or, more generally, overall culture we might expect to observe different 
corporate governance outcomes within these countries. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Earnings Quality and Legal Origin: Evidence from Quebec 
     Introduction 
A number of papers document a link between a country’s legal environment and firms’ 
financial reporting outcomes.  For example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998) document country-level association between countries’ legal origin and the firms’ 
average disclosures.5  This line of research designates France as a civil law country while both 
the United States and Canada are common law countries.  While common law prevails at the 
federal level, one US state has French legal origin, Louisiana.  Similarly, while common law 
prevails at the country level, one Canadian province has French legal origin, Quebec.  The U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission requires what firms must register their securities.6  While 
securities regulation also arises in parallel at the state level, this is largely viewed as coordinated 
and subsumed by federal regulation.  U.S. companies incorporate in a state and the majority 
chooses Delaware.  While Canada has securities regulation at the country level, each province 
has its own securities regulator that maintains a larger degree of autonomy.  Canadian companies 
face a choice in that they can either incorporate under the country-level Canada Business 
Corporations Act (CBCA) or at the province level under the Quebec Companies Act (QCA).  
One possible benefit of the Canadian regulatory system is that competition among standard 
setters can be beneficial and may lead to innovation in the legal environment and enforcement.  
However, one potential cost arises from differential enforcement across provinces or different 
                              
5
 See also La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000), Bushman and Smith 
(2001), Hope (2003), Leuz, Nanda and Wysocky (2003). 
6
 Under U.S. Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934. 
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financial reporting incentives leads to heterogeneity and non-comparability in the reported 
Canadian GAAP numbers. 
This paper exploits the unique aspects of Canadian incorporation and securities 
regulation to investigate the effect of incorporation and legal origin on financial reporting 
outcomes.  First, we provide preliminary evidence on the firm characteristics that lead to 
incorporation decisions.  Specifically, we investigate whether firms headquartered in the French 
legal origin province Quebec incorporate under CBCA or QCA.  In as similar vein, we 
investigate whether firms based in a common legal province CBCA or the securities act of its 
province.  Since the interpretation and enforcement of CBCA may differ across provinces, we 
also test for the effect of incorporation comparing Quebec to non-Quebec based firms. 
Second, we investigate whether Canadian firms’ earnings quality varies with legal origin 
or with level of incorporation.  To proxy for earnings quality, we use the earnings attributes that 
are common in the accounting literature.  Overall, our evidence suggests that earnings attributes 
do vary with legal origin (civil vs. common law). 
Currently, Canadian firms report under either Canadian GAAP, IFRS, or US GAAP.  
First, the majority of publicly traded firms currently prepare audited financial statement under 
Canadian GAAP.  Second, Canadian standard setters have announced a commitment to switch to 
IFRS effective for fiscal years or quarters starting after January 1, 2012.  Early adoption is 
permitted and encouraged, yet only a handful of firms have exercised that option.  Further, since 
Canadian GAAP and US GAAP are perceived as very similar accounting standards, Canadian 
firms are permitted to report using US GAAP.  In fact, the US SEC does not require 
reconciliation from Canadian GAAP to US GAAP under the Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure 
System.  This exemption from reconciliation will continue once Canadian firms adopt IFRS, 
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since IFRS filers from other countries are also exempt from reconciliation to US GAAP.  
Nevertheless, some Canadian firms voluntarily provide reconciliation.   
All firms included in this study disclose using Canadian GAAP.  Hence, any differences 
that we find in earnings attributes are not attributable to accounting standards.  Instead such 
differences are likely attributable to differences in financial reporting incentives faced by 
financial statement preparers and users.  For example, audit quality may be lower for Quebec 
firms relative to non-Quebec firms. 
The variation in earnings attributes that we document is of interest to financial statement 
users.  Further, our results are also of interest to regulators who require or permit different levels 
of registration.  Allowing heterogeneous incorporation procedures, as does Canada, need not be 
detrimental to investors.  The reason is that it is possible that incorporation is a signaling 
mechanism through which firm managers communicate information. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1 gives the institutional background on Canada.  
Section 2 offers a literature review.  Section 3 describes the common earnings attributes used in 
the accounting literature.  Section 4 describes the data collection.  Section 5 summarizes our 
findings for Canada regarding the choice of where to incorporate.  Section 6 analyzes the 
earnings attributes for Canadian firms.  Section 7 concludes and offers suggestions for future 
research.  The (now untabulated) appendix analyzes earnings attributes for US firms comparing 
those based in Louisiana to similar firms based outside Louisiana. 
 
1. Background on Canadian Securities Legislation 
Like the other provinces in Canada, two corporate statues coexist in Quebec, one federal 
and one provincial: the CBCA enacted by the federal Parliament, and the QCA enacted by the 
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National Assembly of Quebec.  Unlike the other provinces in Canada where the provincial 
statues closely mirror the CBCA, the differences between the CBCA and the QCA are significant 
along a number of important dimensions (Daniels, 1991; Bozec, Rousseau, and Laurin, 2008).7  
The primary differences between the QCA and CBCA pertain to minority shareholder rights, 
director and officer liability, and mergers.  Significant differences in minority shareholder rights 
between the QCA and the CBCA include: the lack of an oppression remedy in the QCA, which 
under the CBCA allows security holders, creditors, directors or officers the right to apply to the 
court when the business or the affairs of the corporation are conducted or the directors’ powers 
are being exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial; lesser rights with 
respect to shareholder meetings and voting under the QCA, particularly when enacting 
fundamental changes to the business; and the right of dissent where under the CBCA a 
shareholder may compel the corporation to buy her shares at fair value in the case of a 
fundamental change.  The QCA also differs from the CBCA with respect to the duties and 
liabilities of directors.  The QCA does not specifically require directors to act in the best interest 
of the corporation or to disclose special interests.  Directors are not formally allowed the 
defenses of reasonable prudence and diligence (though Quebec jurisprudence recognizes this to a 
certain extent) and must cover their own expenses in any investigative proceeding against them.8 
One last major difference between the QCA and CBCA is that the QCA allows mergers only 
between companies governed by certain sections of the QCA, whereas, the CBCA is much more 
flexible with respect to mergers and the incorporation statutes of the amalgamating companies.   
                              
7
 We note that although the provincial corporate statutes in the rest of Canada are similar to the CBCA, the level and 
quality of enforcement of these statutes may differ from the enforcement of the CBCA. Thus, in our research design 
we do not treat the rest of Canada uniformly; we distinguish between firms incorporated at the province level and 
federal level for the rest of Canada as well as in Quebec. 
8
 See Core (1997) for an analysis of the determinants of Canadian firms’ decision to offer and purchase directors and 
officers insurance from a third party. 
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In an effort to improve the competiveness of Quebec corporations and facilitate economic 
development in 2009 the Parliament of Quebec passed Bill 63, “Business Corporations Act” 
(Technical Paper 2009), which will replace the QCA in 2011.  Bill 63 represents the first 
substantial reform of Quebec corporate law in nearly thirty years and aims to modernize Quebec 
corporate law.  The Bill was developed in response to a general consensus that the QCA 
inadequately addresses the needs of businesses and fails to provide an efficient operating 
framework for business.  A substantial number of Quebec companies were choosing to 
incorporate under the CBCA, a fact that the Quebec Minister of Finance cites as a primary 
motivation for the Bill.  Essentially, the Bill harmonizes Quebec’s corporate laws with the other 
provinces and the CBCA.  Significant changes in the Bill include: increased minority shareholder 
rights including an oppression remedy and right of dissent; indemnification of directors; 
directors’ duty to disclose conflicts of interest; and relaxation of the restrictive requirements 
governing mergers.   
 
2. Literature Review 
In an influential paper, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) argue 
that a country’s legal origin affects various accounting, finance and corporate governance 
outcomes for firms in that country.  They document cross-country variation in firms’ average 
disclosures with the legal origin.9  Specifically, they find that firms in countries with a civil law 
legal origin provide less disclosure.   
Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) further the examination of a country’s legal origin and 
accounting outcomes.  They note that the origins and focus of common law is fundamentally 
                              
9
 See also Bushman and Smith (2001), Hope (2003), Leuz, Nanda and Wysocky (2003), and La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). 
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different from civil law.  Common law develops from individual action in the private sector and 
stresses legal procedure over rules where private enforcement plays a prominent role in resolving 
disputes between parties.  Thus, the evolution of common law has focused on meeting the 
demands of contracting in markets.  Ball et al. (2000) argue that accounting standards, like 
common law, arose from demands of contracting in markets rather than the government.  They 
note that the dominant form of corporate governance is the ‘shareholder’ model in common law 
countries, where only shareholders elect board members.  In contrast, the ‘stakeholder’ model is 
the dominant form of corporate governance in civil law countries where primary contracting 
parties (e.g., lenders and employees) typically have board representation.  As such, Ball et al. 
(2000) argue that timely accounting income plays a greater role in resolving information 
asymmetry between contracting parties in common law countries than civil law countries 
because these parties operate at greater ‘arm’s length’ from the firm. 
Ball et al. (2000) note that civil law arises from collective planning in the public sector.  
Governmental bodies, not an accounting market, establish accounting standards and are 
responsible for enforcing these standards.  As noted above, the ‘stakeholder’ model is the 
common form of corporate governance in civil law countries.  For example, in Germany 
employees elect 50% of the supervisory board in German stock corporations.  Banks exert 
significant control by voting on behalf of non-voting individual investors whose shares are 
deposited with the banks.  In these countries, firms maintain close relations with their primary 
contracting parties (i.e., debt holders, employees, customers and suppliers).  Ball et al. (2000) 
argue that a natural consequence of this is that financial reporting plays less of a role in resolving 
information asymmetry between managers and financial statement users.  They contend that the 
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primary demand from the stakeholder model is for smooth income so as to reduce volatility of 
payouts to the various stakeholders of the firm.   
Empirically, Ball et al. (2000) study four common law countries – Australia, Canada, the 
UK, and the US – and three code law countries – France, Germany, and Japan – and find that 
accounting income incorporates economic income in a more timely manner in common law 
countries than in civil law countries.  Following Basu (1997), their evidence is based on the R2 
from cross-sectional pooled regressions of earnings on returns, a dummy for negative returns and 
the interaction of these two variables.  Related work by Guenther and Young (2000) provides 
similar evidence via a different empirical specification.  Guenther and Young find that aggregate 
earnings are more highly correlated with real economic activity (such as, GDP) in common law 
countries (the UK and US) than in civil law countries (France, Germany, and Japan).   
The subsequent literature on earnings attributes and legal origin expands the list of 
earnings attributes and institutional features studied.  Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) classify 
31 countries via cluster analysis and find three distinct clusters: (1) outsider economies with 
large stock markets, dispersed ownership, strong investor rights, and strong legal enforcement; 
(2) insider economies with less-developed stock markets, concentrated ownership, but strong 
legal enforcement; and, (3) insider economies with weak legal enforcement.  They observe that 
these clusters closely reflect the partition achieved using common law (1) and civil law (2,3).  
They argue that the private benefits of managing earnings are greater in countries with weaker 
outside investor rights and weaker legal enforcement.  Using an aggregate measure of four 
proxies for earnings management, they find evidence consistent with their prediction. 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) examine the institutional structure of countries in detail to 
understand how they shape the demand for accounting conservatism.  Specifically, they examine 
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the following institutions: legal/judicial systems, the securities laws focusing on private versus 
public enforcement of these laws, the level of state involvement in the economy, and tax 
regimes.  They find that these institutions shape managers’ incentives to provide conservative 
accounting.   
Recent work by Barton, Hansen and Pownall (2010) examines eight attributes commonly 
used to assess earnings quality in a cross-country study to determine which performance 
measures (i.e., sales, earnings, comprehensive income, and operating cash flows) investors 
appear to value most in each country.  They find that performance measures towards the middle 
of the income statement (such as operating income) are more value relevant, but that this is less 
prevalent for firms in common law countries.  In terms of attributes, performance measures that 
are smoother, more predictable and persistent, and less conservative reduce the value relevance 
of the performance measure and are less useful for valuation.  In contrast, performance measures 
that are closer to current period cash flows, better predict next period’s cash flows, and the 
timeliness in capturing bad news are more value relevant.  These rankings are similar across 
common and civil law countries.   
 
3. Earnings Attributes 
Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper (2004), henceforth FLOS, note the absence of one 
universally recognized measure of earnings quality and therefore employ multiple earnings 
attributes as constructs that are commonly argued in prior literature to represent earnings quality.  
They classify their earnings attributes into two categories, intrinsic and extrinsic, where the 
former (latter) measures earnings attributes without (with) reference to stock market reaction.  
We compare firms’ earnings quality for each of these earnings attributes as defined below. 
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3.1  Intrinsic Earnings Attributes 
FLOS identify four intrinsic earnings attributes, Accrual Quality, Earnings Persistence, 
Earnings Predictability, and Earnings Smoothness. 
Accrual Quality 
 While Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2005) present evidence that less reliable 
accruals are associated with lower earnings persistence, FLOS provide evidence that firms’ costs 
of debt and equity vary with accrual quality.  Following FLOS, we use the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) measure of accrual quality.  Dechow and Dichev begin with the observation that accruals 
shift the recognition of cash flows over time so that the adjusted numbers (earnings) better 
measure firm performance than cash flows.  The inherent trade-off in the use of accruals is the 
use of assumptions and estimates that when wrong, must be adjusted in future accruals and 
earnings.  These estimation errors and their subsequent corrections are noise that reduces the 
value of accruals.  Thus, Dechow and Dichev argue that the quality of accruals and earnings is 
decreasing in the magnitude of accrual estimation errors.  Operationally, the rationale behind this 
measure is that non-discretionary current accruals in a period are expected to relate to cash 
receipts and disbursements from the previous, current and subsequent reporting period.  The 
discretionary part of current accruals is therefore estimated as the residual (ε) from the following 
regression:  
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where TCA is the firm’s total current accruals measured as (∆CA – ∆CL – ∆Cash + ∆STDEBT), 
CA is current assets, CL is current liabilities and STDEBT is debt in current liabilities, CFO is 
cash flow from operations from the statement of cash flows, and Assets is the firm’s total assets 
at the end of the annual period.  The standard deviation of the residuals (ε) from equation (1) is 
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the Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure of Accrual Quality.  Large (small) values of Accrual 
Quality relate to poor (good) quality. 
Earnings Persistence 
The Hicksian income concept suggests that earnings should measure permanent income.  
From that perspective, prior research argued that earnings with large transitory components are 
likely to exhibit lower persistence and, hence, also be of lower quality.  As is standard, we 
measure persistence as the slope coefficient in the regression of current earnings on lagged 
earnings, that is, 
tjtjjjtj XX ,1,,1,0, εφφ ++= −        (2) 
where tjX ,  is firm j’s annual split-adjusted earnings per share for period t (measured as firm j’s 
net income before extraordinary items divided by the weighted average number of outstanding 
shares) and the coefficient j,1φ  is the measure of Persistence.  Larger values of j,1φ  indicate more 
permanent earnings while lower values of j,1φ  indicate more transitory earnings. 
Earnings Predictability 
Following Lipe (1990), among others, earnings predictability is the ability to predict 
earnings based on its past value.  Predictability is valued by security analysts and useful in 
security valuation (e.g., AIMR 1993; Lee 1999).  Further, standard setters list predictability as 
one of three primary elements underlying relevance (FASB 1980).  Following Lipe (1990) and 
Francis et al. (2004), we therefore measure Predictability as the standard deviation of the 
residuals in equation (2).  Larger (smaller) values of Predictability relate to less (more) 
predictable earnings. 
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Earnings Smoothness 
Several prior papers suggest that smoothness in earnings is a desirable quality.  Trueman 
and Titman (1988) propose that by smoothing income managers might be able to affect 
investors’ perceptions about the volatility of the underlying earnings process, thereby decreasing 
the firm’s cost of borrowing and improving its terms of trade with other parties.  Goel and 
Thakor (2003) model a setting where smoothing encourages entry by uninformed investors, who 
would otherwise stay out of the market.  Tucker and Zarowin (2006) find that smoothing 
increases the informativeness of earnings.  Subramanyam (1996) suggests that smoothing 
improves the persistence and predictability of reported earnings.  Similar to Leuz, Nanda, and 
Wysocki (2003) and Francis et al. (2004), we measure smoothness of earnings relative to that of 
cash flow from operations.  Smoothness is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of 
income before extraordinary items to the standard deviation of cash flows from operations.  
Larger values of Smoothness indicate less smooth earnings. 
3.2  Extrinsic Earnings Attributes 
Value Relevance of Earnings 
As in FLOS, value relevance measures the statistical association between accounting 
information and long-window returns.  This view of value relevance allows for the possibility 
that earnings is not the source of information used by market participants, but is only correlated 
with information used by investors.  Viewed this way, value relevance measures the ability of 
earnings to capture or summarize information that affects stock returns.  Empirically, we 
measure value relevance as the ability of levels and changes in earnings to explain returns over 
the 12-month period beginning three months after the start of the annual period and ending three 
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months after the end of the annual period.  Specifically we use the R2 from the following 
regression for each firm and each annual period as our measure of value relevance, Relevance. 
tjtjjtjjjtj EARNEARNRET ,,,2,,1,0, εγγγ +∆++=     (4) 
where RETj,t  is firm j’s 12-month return beginning three months after the start of fiscal period t 
and ending three months after the end of fiscal period t as firms are required to file their annual 
report with SEDAR within three months of year-end, EARNj,t is firm j’s income before 
extraordinary items in year t, scaled by market value at end of annual period t-1, and ∆EARNj,t  
is change in firm j’s income before extraordinary items in annual period t, scaled by market 
value at end of annual period t-1.  Larger values of Relevance indicate more value relevant 
earnings. 
Timeliness of Earnings 
Following Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000), Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith (2004) and 
Francis et al. (2004) our measure of timeliness of earnings is the R2  from the reverse regression 
of earnings on returns which was first used in Basu (1997).  The R2 from the reverse regression is 
intended to capture how timely earnings are in reporting concurrently available good and bad 
news.  The regression is as follows: 
tjtjtjjtjjtjjjtj RETNEGRETNEGEARN ,,,,2,,1,,1,0, εββαα +•+++=  (5) 
where NEGj,t = 1 if RETj,t < 0 and 0 otherwise and other variables are as defined previously.  
Larger values of Timeliness imply that earnings concurrently report available good and bad 
news.   
Earnings Conservatism 
Watts (2003a, 2003b) argues that conservatism in earnings is a desirable property.  Kim 
and Kross (2005) suggest that increasing accounting conservatism plays a role in the greater 
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ability of earnings to predict future cash flows in recent years.  Chen, Hemmer, and Zhang 
(2007) argue that conservative accounting may curbs earnings management because under 
conservative accounting lower earnings are less likely due to subpar economic performance and 
more likely due to conservative accounting rules hence lowering managers incentives to increase 
income through earnings management.  We measure Conservatism based on the coefficient on 
the interaction term in equation (5), ,,.10  Larger values of ,,	imply greater conservatism.   
 
     4.  Data 
To identify our sample, we first identified Canadian firms with at least one fiscal year 
ending between January 1997 and November 2009 on the Compustat Xpressfeed North America 
database.  For these firms, we obtain all necessary financial statement information for all 
available firm-years (i.e., we include firm-years prior to 1997).  We require a firm to have at 
least one fiscal year ending in January 1997 or later to ensure that we can obtain incorporation 
information from SEDAR, which provides Canadian public filings back to January 1997.11 For 
each firm in our sample, we collect its incorporation history from the Annual Information Form 
filed on SEDAR, or the other appropriate filing in the event a company is exempt from filing an 
Annual Information Form.  To construct annual returns, we obtain monthly returns data from the 
monthly security file on Compustat.  We exclude firms in the financial or utilities industries 
                              
10
 We note that US studies (e.g., Basu 1997, Pope and Walker 1999, Givoly and Hayn 2000 and Francis et al. 2004) 
typically measure conservatism as the ratio of bad news to good news with (,, + ,,)/,,. However, as with 
cross-country studies examining Canada (e.g., Ball, Kothari and Robin 2000, Bushman and Piotroski, 2006) ,, is 
very small and negative, making interpreting the ratio of good news to bad news unreliable. As such, we focus on 
,, 	as our measure of conservatism. We note that this measure of conservatism has been criticized in some recent 
papers including Dietrich, Muller and Riedl (2007), Givoly, Hayn and Natarajan (2007), and Patatoukas and Thomas 
(2010) as not always capturing conservatism. 
11
 SEDAR in Canada is analogous to EDGAR in the US and is available at: www.sedar.com. 
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(two-digit NAICS codes 52 and 22, respectively).  The number of firms meeting these 
requirements is 1,397. 
For our analysis of earnings attributes, we require that data on all seven attributes are 
available for each firm-year to mitigate concerns that differences in sample composition affect 
comparisons across attributes.  We also exclude firms filing with the SEC or using US GAAP.  
US GAAP and Canadian GAAP are viewed as similar by regulators, as evidenced by the absence 
of a mandatory disclosure requirement of reconciliation of accounting differences under the 
Multi-jurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS).  Foreign private issuers in the US, that is non-
US-based firms, that report under the accounting standards of their home country were required 
to explain to investors what their accounting income and shareholders' equity would have been 
under US GAAP.  Since US GAAP and Canadian GAAP are similar, MJDS specifically 
exempted Canadian firms that report under Canadian GAAP and list in the US from having to do 
this reconciliation.  This means that Canadian firms are permitted to report under either US 
GAAP or Canadian GAAP (some Canadian firms voluntarily report under both).  Recently, the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission exempted non-US-based firms that report under IFRS 
from reconciliation.  As Canadian firms switch to IFRS, they will maintain the exemption from 
reconciliation requirements. 
Notwithstanding the previous arguments, some differences in accounting rules between 
US GAAP and Canadian GAAP persisted during our sample period.  Bandyopadhyay, Hanna, 
and Richardson (1994) investigate a sample of firms that were listed both on Toronto and a U.S. 
stock exchange between 1983 and 1989.  Overall, they find that earnings scaled by market 
capitalization are 2% lower under US GAAP than Canadian GAAP.  Some of the main source of 
differences in accounting rules pertain to foreign exchange gains or losses on foreign long-term 
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debt, early extinguishment of debt, extraordinary items, and interest capitalization of self-
constructed assets [see Table 1 on page 265].  In our analyses below, we exclude US GAAP 
reporting Canadian firms and compare only firms that report audited Canadian GAAP 
statements.  To the extent that differences in accounting standards are industry specific, our 
matching on industry mitigates this concern.  After matching based on the procedures described 
below, our sample of Quebec firms comprises 738 firm-year observations for 167 firms (102 
firms incorporate under the CBCA and 65 firms incorporate under the QCA). 
Following prior research, we employ a matched sample to examine earnings attributes 
(Lang, Raedy, and Yetman, 2003; Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2006; Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 
2008).  Specifically, we match Quebec firms with non-Quebec firms on the level of 
incorporation (federal or provincial), size, and industry.  First, matching on level of incorporation 
allows us to compare firms that made similar decisions regarding where to incorporate.  
Differences in earnings attributes among firms that incorporate under CBCA but are located in 
different provinces may persist, however, due to differences in enforcement between securities 
regulators in different provinces.  Second, matching on size is intended to control for size-related 
differences such as the information environment.  Third, matching on industry is intended to 
control for differences in earnings attributes that vary by industry.   
We match the final year of each Quebec firm with a non-Quebec firm in the same year, 
same industry, and closest in market value without replacement.  If a match is not found for a 
firm, we try to match prior years of the Quebec firm with a non-Quebec firm in the same year, 
same industry and closest in size.  We then retain all overlapping firm years for the Quebec firms 
and their matched non-Quebec firms.  For example, if a Quebec firm has data from 1998 through 
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2007 and its matched non-Quebec firm has data from 2000 through 2008, we retain only data 
from 2000 through 2007 for both the Quebec firm and its matched non-Quebec firm.   
     5.  Choice Between Federal and Provincial Incorporation 
We formally examine firms’ decisions to incorporate at the federal or provincial level to 
understand the decision and ensure our research design analyzing earnings attributes controls for 
any systematic differences across provinces.  Since the incorporation decision is a relatively 
permanent decision, we retain only the final firm-year for each firm in our sample and examine 
whether the choice is associated with several important firm characteristics.12,13  Our final sample 
consists of 1,397 firms.  Panel A in table 1 indicates that a vast majority (96%) of firms are 
located in four provinces: Ontario (34%), Alberta (27%), British Columbia (19%), and Quebec 
(16%).  It is also clear that a much larger proportion of Quebec firms incorporate under the 
CBCA relative to other provinces consistent with the Quebec Minister of Finance’s concerns 
about the competiveness of the QCA.  Panel B in table 1 shows significant industry 
concentration in the Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction industry (35%) as well as 
industry concentration in the Manufacturing industry (31%).  Based on panels A and B, we focus 
our analysis on these four provinces and include industry fixed effects in our analysis. 
We performed a thorough review of reasons cited for incorporating either at the federal or 
provincial to examine in our analysis.  The only consistent reason given is that firms operating 
across Canada or internationally are more likely to incorporate at the federal level (Carnaghan 
and Gunz, 2007).  Accordingly, we include size in our analysis.  We also note that in Quebec 
mergers are supposedly easier to complete under the CBCA than under the QCA (Cloutier, 
                              
12
 Approximately 5% of firms in our sample switch from provincial to federal incorporation and less than 0.01% 
switch from federal to provincial incorporation. 
13
 Using the first firm-year for each firm year yields similar results. The first firm-year may better capture firm 
characteristics at the time the firm made its decision regarding where to incorporate. 
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2009).  We include intangible assets to capture a firms tendency engage in mergers as accounting 
rules only allow purchased intangibles to be recorded and mergers are typically when most 
intangibles are recorded.  In addition to size and intangible assets, we also examine whether 
leverage, growth, filing status with the SEC, and auditor are associated with firms’ decisions to 
incorporate at the federal or provincial level.14  Panel C provides descriptive statistics for these 
variables and indicates that Quebec and non-Quebec firms are relatively similar in terms of size 
and leverage.  Many more Quebec firms file under the CBCA than non-Quebec firms, while 
more non-Quebec firms file with the SEC and employ BigN auditors.   
We employ the following logistic regression to analyze the decision: 
/0 =	1 + 10 + 1 !0 + 12ℎ0 + 1"#!340 
+1(5	640 + 1780 + #8	599 + %0 
  
                              
14
 In untabulated results, we proxy for growth opportunities by including the book-to-market ratio which is not 
statistically significantly related to firms’ incorporation decisions. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Incorporation Decision 
The sample for the analysis of firms’ incorporation decisions consists of the last year each firm in our 
sample reports to System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) between January 1, 
1997 and November 30, 2009.  SEDAR data is not available prior to January 1, 1997 and Compustat data 
was not available after November 30, 2009 at the time we began our study.  This results in a final sample 
of 1,397 firms. 
 
Panel A: Province Breakdown 
 
Province 
Number of 
Firms 
Percentage of 
Firms 
Number of 
CBCA Firms 
Percentage 
CBCA Firms 
Alberta 382 27% 52 14% 
British Columbia 267 19% 66 25% 
Ontario 473 34% 171 36% 
Quebec 226 16% 147 65% 
Other Provinces 49 4% 25 51% 
Total  1,397 100% 461  
A firm’s province is determined by the location of its headquarters. Other Provinces includes Manitoba, 
New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan. CBCA 
represents firms that incorporated under the Canadian Business Corporations Act, the federal 
incorporation statute in Canada. 
 
Panel B: Industry Breakdown 
 
NAICS Industry Classification (Two-
Digit) 
Number of 
Firms 
Percentage of 
Firms 
Number of 
CBCA Firms 
Percentage 
CBCA Firms 
Information                                                         154 11% 65 42% 
Manufacturing 443 31% 193 44% 
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas 
Extraction                                    
487 35% 88 18% 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services                                  
67 5% 24 36% 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing                                               42 3% 10 24% 
Retail Trade                                                                     41 3% 20 49% 
Wholesale Trade                                                    36 3% 16 44% 
Other Industries 127 9% 45 35% 
Total 1,397 100% 461  
Other Industries consists of industries individually representing less than 3% of the sample. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Incorporation Decision (continued) 
Panel C: Variables Used in Analysis of Incorporation Decision 
 Quebec (N = 226)  Non-Quebec (N = 1,171)  All Firms (N = 1,397) 
 
Variables 
 
Mea
n 
 
Media
n 
Standard 
Deviatio
n 
  
Mean 
 
Median 
Standard 
Deviatio
n 
  
Mea
n 
 
Media
n 
Standard 
Deviatio
n 
Size 4.92 4.78 2.22  4.62* 4.65 2.24  4.67 4.66 2.24 
Leverage 0.28 0.21 0.42  0.55 0.18 5.29  0.51 0.19 4.84 
Growth 0.57 0.04 6.63  0.80 0.11##
# 
6.46  0.77 0.08 6.49 
Intangible
s 
0.16 0.05 0.21  0.08**
* 
0.00##
# 
0.15  0.09 0.00 0.16 
SEC Filer 0.09 0.00 0.28  0.19**
* 
0.00##
# 
0.39  0.17 0.00 0.38 
Auditor 0.62 1.00 0.49  0.75**
* 
1.00##
# 
0.43  0.73 1.00 0.45 
CBCA 0.65 1.00 0.48  0.27**
* 
0.00##
# 
0.44  0.33 0.00 0.47 
***, **, * indicates t-test of means statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-
tailed). ###, ##, # indicates Wilcoxon test statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively (two-tailed). 
 
Size is the log of total assets (AT). Leverage is long-term debt (DLC+DLTT) divided by total assets. 
Growth is the annual percentage change in sales (SALE). Intangibles is intangible assets (INTAN) scaled 
by total assets. SEC Filer is equal to one if the firm files with the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission, 
and zero otherwise. Auditor is equal to one if the firm uses a BigN auditor, and zero otherwise. CBCA is 
equal to one if the firm is incorporated under the Canadian Business Corporations Act, and zero 
otherwise. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Incorporation Decision (continued) 
Panel D: Pearson Correlation Table 
Variables Size Leverage Growth Intangibles SEC Filer Auditor CBCA 
        
Size 1.000 -0.144 0.021 0.120 0.109 0.366 0.195 
  0.000 0.437 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Leverage  1.000 -0.013 0.009 0.031 -0.073 0.001 
   0.634 0.727 0.254 0.007 0.966 
Growth   1.000 0.016 0.025 0.013 -0.036 
    0.545 0.347 0.618 0.177 
Intangibles    1.000 0.042 -0.017 0.160 
     0.121 0.531 0.000 
SEC Filer     1.000 -0.009 0.038 
      0.739 0.152 
Auditor      1.000 0.040 
       0.134 
CBCA       1.000 
 p-values in italics. 
 
Size is the log of total assets (AT). Leverage is long-term debt (DLC+DLTT) divided by total assets. 
Growth is the annual percentage change in sales (SALE). Intangibles is intangible assets (INTAN) scaled 
by total assets. SEC Filer is equal to one if the firm files with the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission, 
and zero otherwise. Auditor is equal to one if the firm uses a BigN auditor, and zero otherwise. CBCA is 
equal to one if the firm is incorporated under the Canadian Business Corporations Act, and zero 
otherwise. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Incorporation Decision (continued) 
Panel E: Incorporation Decision Conditional on Province 
Province 
Incorporation   
ABCA BCBCA OBCA QCA OTHER CBCA Total 
Alberta 308 8 9 0 5 52 382 
1 22.05 0.57 0.64 0.00 0.36 3.72 27.34 
2 80.63 2.09 2.36 0.00 1.31 13.61  
3 89.80 3.96 3.19 0.00 14.71 11.28   
British Columbia 14 173 8 0 6 66 267 
1 1.00 12.38 0.57 0.00 0.43 4.72 19.11 
2 5.24 64.79 3.00 0.00 2.25 24.72  
3 4.08 85.64 2.84 0.00 17.65 14.32   
Ontario 12 17 260 3 10 171 473 
1 0.86 1.22 18.61 0.21 0.72 12.24 33.86 
2 2.54 3.59 54.97 0.63 2.11 36.15  
3 3.50 8.42 92.20 4.00 29.41 37.09   
Quebec 2 2 4 71 0 147 226 
1 0.14 0.14 0.29 5.08 0 10.52 16.18 
2 0.88 0.88 1.77 31.42 0 65.04  
3 0.58 0.99 1.42 94.67 0.00 31.89   
Other Provinces 7 2 1 1 13 25 49 
1 0.5 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.93 1.79 3.51 
2 14.29 4.08 2.04 2.04 26.53 51.02  
3 2.04 0.99 0.35 1.33 38.24 5.42   
Total 343 202 282 75 34 461 1,397 
24.55 14.46 20.19 5.37 2.43 33.00 100.00 
1 is the percentage of the sample. 2 is the row percentage. 3 is the column percentage.   
 
Other Provinces includes Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, 
and Saskatchewan.  ABCA is the Alberta Business Corporations Act. BCBCA is the British Columbia 
Business Corporations Act. OBCA is the Ontario Business Corporations Act. QCA is the Quebec 
Companies Act. OTHER consists of the following provincial incorporation acts:  Manitoba Corporations 
Act, New Brunswick Business Corporations Act, Newfoundland Corporations Act, Nova Scotia 
Companies Act, Saskatchewan Companies Act, and the Yukon Business Corporations Act.  CBCA 
represents firms that incorporated under the Canadian Business Corporations Act, the federal 
incorporation statute in Canada. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Incorporation Decision (continued) 
Panel F: Accounting Standard Conditional on Province 
Province 
Accounting Standard   
Canadian GAAP US GAAP Total 
Alberta 378 4 382 
1 27.06 0.29 27.34 
2 98.95 1.05  
3 27.81 10.53   
British Columbia 257 10 267 
1 18.40 0.72 19.11 
2 96.25 3.75  
3 18.91 26.32   
Ontario 451 22 473 
1 32.28 1.57 33.86 
2 95.35 4.65  
3 33.19 57.89   
Quebec 224 2 226 
1 16.03 0.14 16.18 
2 99.12 0.88  
3 16.48 5.26   
Other Provinces 49 0 49 
1 3.51 0.00 3.51 
2 100.00 0.00  
3 3.61 0.00   
Total 1,359 38 1,397 
97.28 2.72 100.00 
1 is the percentage of the sample. 2 is the row percentage. 3 is the column percentage.   
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Canadian firms are permitted to report under either Canadian Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) or under US GAAP. Other Provinces includes Manitoba, New Brunswick, 
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan. 
Table 2 presents our analysis of firms’ incorporation decisions.  The positive and 
significant coefficient on size for most models indicates that larger firms are more likely to 
incorporate at the federal level.  For brevity, we do not present industry effects, but note that 
various industries are associated both positively and negatively with incorporating at the federal 
level.  This finding is consistent with our discussions with Canadian regulators who suggested 
that provincial incorporation is common in certain industries (i.e., mining and oil and gas).  In 
our province of primary interest, Quebec, only industry effects are associated with the decision to 
incorporate under the CBCA.  This analysis suggests that controlling for size and industry are 
important in our analysis of earnings attributes, which we address by matching on size and 
industry.    
  
83 
 
 
       
Table 2: Logistic Regression of Firm Incorporation Decision 
The sample for the analysis of firms’ incorporation decisions consists of the last year each firm 
in our sample reports to System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) 
between January 1, 1997 and November 30, 2009.  SEDAR data is not available prior to January 
1, 1997 and Compustat data was not available after November 30, 2009 at the time we began our 
study.  This results in a final sample of 1,397 firms. 
 
Panel A: Pooled Analysis 
Variables All Provinces All Provinces  All Provinces  All Provinces 
Intercept -1.767*** -1.680*  -0.533**  -0.653 
 (0.174) (0.893)  (0.218)  (0.954) 
Size 0.199*** 0.219***  0.195***  0.210*** 
 (0.031) (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.035) 
Leverage 0.120 0.060  0.076  0.060 
 (0.158) (0.171)  (0.164)  (0.173) 
Growth -0.054 -0.025  -0.022  -0.012 
 (0.036) (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
Intangibles 1.760*** 0.797**  0.730*  0.420 
 (0.352) (0.397)  (0.383)  (0.420) 
SEC Filer 0.043 0.046  0.170  0.167 
 (0.157) (0.165)  (0.170)  (0.175) 
Auditor -0.119 -0.118  0.144  0.117 
 (0.145) (0.149)  (0.156)  (0.158) 
Alberta    -2.510***  -2.230*** 
    (0.216)  (0.234) 
British Columbia    -1.591***  -1.449*** 
    (0.214)  (0.221) 
Ontario    -1.226***  -1.167*** 
    (0.177)  (0.183) 
Other Provinces    -0.714**  -0.640* 
    (0.329)  (0.336) 
       
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes  No  Yes 
Observations 1,397 1,397  1,397  1,397 
Log Likelihood 843.660*** 797.933***  761.235***  744.777*** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.048 0.099  0.141  0.159 
***, **, * indicates two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
CBCA is equal to one if a firm is incorporated under the Canadian Business Corporations Act, and zero otherwise. Size is the log of total assets 
(AT). Leverage is long-term debt (DLC+DLTT) divided by total assets. Growth is the annual percentages changes in sales (SALE). Intangibles is 
intangible assets (INTAN) scaled by total assets. SEC Filer is equal to one if the firm files with the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission, and 
zero otherwise. Auditor is equal to one if the firm uses a BigN auditor, and zero otherwise. Alberta is equal to one if the firm is headquartered in 
Alberta, and zero otherwise. British Columbia is equal to one if the firm is headquartered in British Columbia, and zero otherwise. Ontario is 
equal to one if the firm is headquartered in Ontario, and zero otherwise. Quebec is equal to one if the firm is headquartered in Quebec, and zero 
otherwise. Other Provinces includes Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan. 
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Table 2: Logistic Regression of Firm Incorporation Decision (continued) 
Panel B: By Province Analysis with Industry Fixed Effects 
Variables Alberta 
British 
Columbia Ontario Quebec 
Other 
Provinces 
      
Intercept -3.585*** -2.100*** -2.683*** 1.473* 1.603 
 (0.907) (0.665) (0.731) (0.862) (1.956) 
      
Size 0.265*** 0.251*** 0.174*** 0.075 0.040 
 (0.095) (0.080) (0.057) (0.078) (0.216) 
      
Leverage 0.641 -0.001 -0.023 0.354 -1.487 
 (0.861) (0.039) (0.128) (0.387) (1.210) 
      
Growth -0.409* -0.013 -0.006 0.209 -0.666 
 (0.247) (0.030) (0.025) (0.193) (0.473) 
      
Intangibles 1.142 1.485 -0.076 0.185 3.725 
 (1.370) (1.073) (0.654) (0.794) (2.696) 
      
SEC Filer 0.805 0.067 0.308 0.032 -0.400 
 (0.505) (0.344) (0.269) (0.553) (1.269) 
      
Auditor -0.329 0.312 0.377 0.056 -0.106 
 (0.435) (0.423) (0.257) (0.327) (0.943) 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 382 267 473 226 49 
Log Likelihood 134.471*** 126.005*** 292.950** 131.198** 26.592 
Pseudo R-
squared 0.115 0.152 0.053 0.104 0.218 
***, **, * indicates two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
CBCA is equal to one if a firm is incorporated under the Canadian Business Corporations Act, 
and zero otherwise. Size is the log of total assets (AT). Leverage is long-term debt (DLC+DLTT) 
divided by total assets. Growth is the annual percentage change in sales (SALE). Intangibles is 
intangible assets (INTAN) scaled by total assets. SEC Filer is equal to one if the firm files with 
the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission, and zero otherwise. Auditor is equal to one if the firm 
uses a BigN auditor, and zero otherwise.  
85 
 
 
       
Table 2: Logistic Regression of Firm Incorporation Decision (continued) 
Panel C: By Province Analysis without Industry Fixed Effects 
Variables Alberta 
British 
Columbia Ontario Quebec 
Other 
Provinces 
      
Intercept -3.049*** -2.398*** -1.637*** -0.304 -0.329 
 (0.565) (0.392) (0.305) (0.391) (1.064) 
      
Size 0.245*** 0.237*** 0.169*** 0.115 0.128 
 (0.091) (0.074) (0.054) (0.072) (0.176) 
      
Leverage 0.395 0.037 -0.142 0.618 -0.732 
 (0.806) (0.307) (0.299) (0.431) (0.790) 
      
Growth -0.377 -0.031 0.019 0.139 -0.335 
 (0.232) (0.065) (0.049) (0.155) (0.380) 
      
Intangibles 1.516 2.455** -0.189 0.857 1.898 
 (1.216) (0.975) (0.598) (0.757) (1.956) 
      
SEC Filer 1.013** -0.215 0.281 -0.167 -0.542 
 (0.459) (0.321) (0.261) (0.510) (1.046) 
      
Auditor -0.296 0.297 0.310 0.119 -0.108 
 (0.428) (0.397) (0.251) (0.305) (0.733) 
Industry Fixed 
Effects No No No No No 
Observations 382 267 473 226 49 
Log Likelihood 137.623*** 135.410*** 299.418** 142.005 30.788 
Pseudo R-
squared 0.0945 0.0931 0.0325 0.0291 0.0932 
***, **, * indicates two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
CBCA is equal to one if a firm is incorporated under the Canadian Business Corporations Act, 
and zero otherwise. Size is the log of total assets (AT). Leverage is long-term debt (DLC+DLTT) 
divided by total assets. Growth is the annual percentage change in sales (SALE). Intangibles is 
intangible assets (INTAN) scaled by total assets. SEC Filer is equal to one if the firm files with 
the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission, and zero otherwise. Auditor is equal to one if the firm 
uses a BigN auditor, and zero otherwise.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Matched-Pairs 
The sample consists of all firms-years for the matched sample and consists of 167 unique Quebec firms and their 
matched pairs. Quebec firms are matched to non-Quebec firms on incorporation level, industry and market value 
and all overlapping firm-years are retained resulting in 738 firm-years. 
 
Panel A: All Matched-Pairs 
  Quebec (N = 738 firm-years)   Non-Quebec (N = 738 firm-years) 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean   Median   
Standard 
Deviation 
          
Firm Characteristics:         
          
Size 5.389 5.516 1.871  5.297  5.463  2.242 
MV 5.091 5.224 1.808  5.242  5.230  1.888 
Sales 1,023 283 2,346  1,564 *** 239  3,857 
Growth 0.188 0.071 0.686  0.224  0.073  0.763 
Leverage 0.246 0.224 0.241  0.262  0.221  0.486 
          
Variables to Construct Earnings Attributes:       
          
TCAt -0.001 0.002 0.082  0.005  0.004  0.107 
CFOt-1 0.013 0.064 0.245  -0.060 *** 0.050 ### 0.380 
CFOt 0.023 0.075 0.230  -0.052 *** 0.057 ### 0.364 
CFOt+1 0.032 0.084 0.260  -0.067 *** 0.057 ### 0.458 
Xt-1 0.237 0.260 1.268  0.172  0.184  2.108 
Xt 0.245 0.260 1.255  0.228  0.184  2.054 
NIBEt -0.030 0.037 0.276  -0.124 *** 0.036  0.504 
CFOSt 0.018 0.078 0.299  -0.086 *** 0.059 ### 0.532 
RETt 0.139 0.015 0.659  0.179  0.060  0.753 
EARNt 0.002 0.052 0.238  -0.031 ** 0.040 ### 0.273 
∆EARNt 0.038 0.006 0.366  0.030  0.006  0.330 
NEGt 0.483 0.000 0.500  0.445  0.000  0.497 
                    
 ***, **, * indicates t-test of means statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
###, ##, # indicates Wilcoxon test statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
Size is the log of total assets (AT). MV is the log of market value (CSHO*PRCC_F). Sales is the firm’s sales 
(SALE). Leverage is long-term debt (DLC+DLTT) divided by total assets. Growth is the annual percentage change 
in sales (SALE). TCAt is total current accruals scaled by average total assets. CFOt is the cash flow from operations 
in year t calculated as income before extraordinary items (IB) less total accruals scaled by average total assets. Xt is 
the split-adjusted earnings per share calculated as income before extraordinary items in year t divided by the 
weighted average number of outstanding shares during year t. NIBEt is net income before extraordinary items scaled 
by beginning total assets. CFOSt is CFOt scaled by beginning total assets. RETt is the 12-month return ending three 
months after the end of fiscal year t. EARNt is income before extraordinary items scaled by market value at the end 
of year t-1. ∆EARNt is the change in income before extraordinary items in year t scaled by market value at the end 
of year t-1. NEGt is equal to one if RETt < 0, and zero otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
extreme percentiles.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Matched-Pairs (continued) 
The sample consists of all firms-years for the Quebec QCA matched sample and consists of 65 unique Quebec QCA 
firms and their matched pairs. Quebec QCA firms are matched to non-Quebec firms on incorporation level, industry 
and market value and all overlapping firm-years are retained resulting in 338 firm-years. 
 
Panel B: Quebec QCA firms to Non-Quebec Provincial firms 
  Quebec (N =  338 firm-years)   Non-Quebec (N = 338 firm-years) 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean   Median   
Standard 
Deviation 
          
Firm Characteristics:         
          
Size 5.061 5.247 2.092  4.656 ** 4.657 ## 2.373 
MV 4.789 4.989 1.873  4.777  4.846  1.942 
Sales 1040 213 2334  838  113 ## 2012 
Growth 0.222 0.082 0.762  0.264  0.079  0.808 
Leverage 0.272 0.240 0.290  0.284  0.214 ## 0.679 
          
Variables to Construct Earnings Attributes:       
          
TCAt 0.000 0.003 0.083  0.007  0.006  0.006 
CFOt-1 -0.024 0.052 0.303  -0.129 *** 0.031 ## 0.031 
CFOt -0.018 0.059 0.288  -0.121 *** 0.044 ## 0.044 
CFOt+1 0.006 0.065 0.284  -0.134 *** 0.046 ## 0.046 
Xt-1 0.253 0.200 1.195  0.139  0.054  0.054 
Xt 0.249 0.167 1.233  0.166  0.068 # 0.068 
NIBEt -0.071 0.028 0.360  -0.206 *** 0.022  0.022 
CFOSt -0.033 0.061 0.401  -0.174 *** 0.046 # 0.046 
RETt 0.117 -0.016 0.704  0.200  0.041  0.041 
EARNt -0.019 0.050 0.275  -0.050  0.022 ### 0.022 
∆EARNt 0.040 0.005 0.381  0.047  0.000  0.000 
NEGt 0.509 1.000 0.501  0.462  0.000  0.000 
                    
 ***, **, * indicates t-test of means statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). ###, ##, # 
indicates Wilcoxon test statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
The sample consists of all firms-years for Quebec QCA firms are matched to non-Quebec firms incorporated at the provincial 
level on industry and market value. Size is the log of total assets (AT). MV is the log of market value (CSHO*PRCC_F). Sales is 
the firm’s sales (SALE). Leverage is long-term debt (DLC+DLTT) divided by total assets. Growth is the annual percentages 
changes in sales (SALE). TCAt is total current accruals scaled by average total assets. CFOt is the cash flow from operations in 
year t calculated as income before extraordinary items (IB) less total accruals scaled by average total assets. Xt is the split-
adjusted earnings per share calculated as income before extraordinary items in year t divided by the weighted average number of 
outstanding shares during year t. NIBEt is net income before extraordinary items scaled by beginning total assets. CFOSt is CFOt 
scaled by beginning total assets. RETt is the 12-month return ending three months after the end of fiscal year t. EARNt is income 
before extraordinary items scaled by market value at the end of year t-1. ∆EARNt is the change in income before extraordinary 
items in year t scaled by market value at the end of year t-1. NEGt is equal to one if RETt < 0, and zero otherwise. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the extreme percentiles. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Matched-Pairs (continued) 
The sample consists of all firms-years for the Quebec CBCA matched sample and consists of 102 unique Quebec 
CBCA firms and their matched pairs. Quebec CBCA firms are matched to non-Quebec firms on incorporation level, 
industry and market value and all overlapping firm-years are retained resulting in 405 firm-years. 
 
Panel C: Quebec CBCA firms to Non-Quebec CBCA firms 
  Quebec (N =  405 firm-years)   Non-Quebec (N = 405 firm-years) 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation   Mean   Median   
Standard 
Deviation 
          
Firm Characteristics:         
          
Size 5.663 5.650 1.618  5.831  5.919 # 1.975 
MV 5.342 5.388 1.714  5.630 ** 5.420 ## 1.752 
Sales 1,010 349 2,359  2,169 *** 435  4,811 
Growth 0.161 0.065 0.620  0.193  0.070  0.727 
Leverage 0.225 0.207 0.187  0.244  0.230  0.223 
          
Variables to Construct Earnings Attributes:       
          
TCAt -0.002 0.001 0.080  0.004  0.003  0.089 
CFOt-1 0.044 0.077 0.178  -0.002 *** 0.061 ## 0.278 
CFOt 0.057 0.084 0.160  0.006 *** 0.068 ### 0.243 
CFOt+1 0.054 0.091 0.237  -0.011 *** 0.068 ### 0.325 
Xt 0.241 0.300 1.275  0.280  0.341  2.286 
Xt-1 0.224 0.290 1.327  0.199  0.340  2.352 
NIBEt 0.004 0.044 0.173  -0.056 *** 0.039 # 0.337 
CFOSt 0.060 0.087 0.162  -0.013 *** 0.070 ### 0.356 
RETt 0.157 0.035 0.618  0.161  0.067  0.676 
EARNt 0.019 0.054 0.201  -0.016 ** 0.053  0.261 
∆EARNt 0.037 0.006 0.353  0.017  0.008  0.259 
NEGt 0.462 0.000 0.499  0.432  0.000  0.496 
                    
***, **, * indicates t-test of means statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). ###, ##, # 
indicates Wilcoxon test statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
The sample consists of all firms-years for Quebec CBCA firms are matched to non-Quebec CBCA firms on industry and market 
value. Size is the log of total assets (AT). MV is the log of market value (CSHO*PRCC_F). Sales is the firm’s sales (SALE). 
Leverage is long-term debt (DLC+DLTT) divided by total assets. Growth is the annual percentages changes in sales (SALE). 
TCAt is total current accruals scaled by average total assets. CFOt is the cash flow from operations in year t calculated as income 
before extraordinary items (IB) less total accruals scaled by average total assets. Xt is the split-adjusted earnings per share 
calculated as income before extraordinary items in year t divided by the weighted average number of outstanding shares during 
year t. NIBEt is net income before extraordinary items scaled by beginning total assets. CFOSt is CFOt scaled by beginning total 
assets. RETt is the 12-month return ending three months after the end of fiscal year t. EARNt is income before extraordinary 
items scaled by market value at the end of year t-1. ∆EARNt is the change in income before extraordinary items in year t scaled 
by market value at the end of year t-1. NEGt is equal to one if RETt < 0, and zero otherwise. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the extreme percentiles. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Matched-Pairs (continued) 
Panel D: Pearson Correlation Table for Variables Used to Construct Earnings Attributes 
 
Variable TCAt CFOt-1 CFOt CFOt+1 Xt Xt-1 NIBEt CFOSt RETt EARNt ∆EARNt NEGt 
TCAt 1.000 0.050 -0.180 0.068 0.115 0.033 0.090 -0.162 0.087 0.153 0.049 -0.082 
  0.051 <.0001 0.008 <.0001 0.196 0.001 <.0001 0.001 <.0001 0.055 0.001 
CFOt-1  1.000 0.678 0.573 0.164 0.290 0.616 0.579 0.019 0.369 -0.250 -0.105 
   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.464 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
CFOt   1.000 0.721 0.294 0.206 0.871 0.903 0.049 0.602 0.137 -0.127 
    <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.055 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
CFOt+1    1.000 0.176 0.154 0.723 0.704 -0.003 0.399 0.052 -0.103 
     <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.896 <.0001 0.041 <.0001 
Xt     1.000 0.596 0.289 0.251 0.124 0.516 0.172 -0.184 
      <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Xt-1      1.000 0.188 0.167 -0.014 0.306 -0.308 -0.070 
       <.0001 <.0001 0.585 <.0001 <.0001 0.007 
NIBEt       1.000 0.948 0.043 0.639 0.177 -0.116 
        <.0001 0.096 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
CFOSt        1.000 0.006 0.590 0.164 -0.078 
         0.820 <.0001 <.0001 0.003 
RETt         1.000 0.115 0.178 -0.601 
          <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
EARNt          1.000 0.236 -0.183 
           <.0001 <.0001 
∆EARNt           1.000 -0.107 
            <.0001 
NEGt            1.000 
p-values in italics. 
 
We pool Quebec and Non-Quebec firms for this analysis.
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6.  Analysis of Earnings Attributes 
Following prior research, including Lang, Raedy, and Yetman (2003), Leuz (2003), 
Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006), Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008), we construct our earnings 
attributes based on cross-sectional data.15  To construct statistical tests of difference, we employ 
bootstrap-based tests, which use the sample data to generate a distribution for the test statistic.  
We follow the procedure outlined by Noreen (1989) referred to as “approximate 
randomization.”16  Dichev and Tang (2009) and Minnis (2010) use this procedure to test 
differences in R2.  A key advantage of this approach is that it does not require assumptions about 
the distribution of each earnings attribute.  Our null hypothesis that there is no difference 
between Quebec and non-Quebec firms and approximate randomization examines how 
frequently the observed differences in earnings attributes would occur randomly.  Specifically, 
we randomly assign firms as Quebec and non-Quebec firms.  Then we calculate each earnings 
attribute for ‘pseudo’ Quebec and non-Quebec firms and record the difference in earnings 
attributes between the two groups.  We then note if the differences in earnings attributes from the 
randomly generated sample is greater than the actual observed differences.  We repeat these 
steps 10,000 and the p-value is the number of times the randomly generated difference in an 
earnings attribute is greater than the actual difference.    
Table 4 reports the results from comparing the earnings attributes for 738 matched pairs 
of firm years.  Recall that for each matched pair, one firm is located in Quebec, while the other 
firm is located in a province other than Quebec.  Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) hypothesize that 
financial reporting incentives shape the standards and provide evidence that accounting standards 
                              
15
 An alternative approach would be to estimate firm-specific earnings attributes using a time series of firm-specific 
data. We do not use this approach because it would severely limit our sample size due the length of the time series 
required to estimate the earnings attributes. 
16
 We also perform bootstrap tests following Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008) and find similar results. 
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differ between common law countries and civil law countries.  To control for differences 
in accounting standards, we omit those Canadian firms that report under US GAAP, such that 
both Quebec and non-Quebec firms in our matched pairs report under Canadian GAAP.  As a 
consequence, any differences in earnings attributes for our matched pairs, which we report 
below, are not due to accounting standards per se, but rather due to the underlying financial 
reporting incentives.  
Panel A of Table 4 reports the tests for differences between Quebec and non-Quebec 
firms with regards to accounting-based earnings attributes.  First, we find that Accrual Quality is 
statistically significantly higher for Quebec firms at the 1 percent significance level (as 
evidenced by the lower standard deviation of residuals from the accrual regression specified in 
equation (1)).  Second, we find that Persistence is statistically significantly higher for non-
Quebec firms at the 4 percent significance level.  Third, we find that Predictability is statistically 
significantly for non-Quebec at the 2 percent level (as evidenced by the lower standard 
deviation).  In summary, these three intrinsic accounting-based earnings attributes differ for 
similar Canadian firms located inside and outside Quebec. 
Similarly, Panel B of Table 4 reports our tests for differences in market-based earnings 
attributes.  We only find statistically significant differences with regards to Timeliness, which is 
statistically significantly higher for Quebec firms.  Since Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) find 
that Timeliness is higher for common law countries, one would have expected the reverse result 
based on their hypothesized differences in accounting standards.  As a consequence, our finding 
suggests the importance of controlling for differences in accounting standards when investigating 
the pure direct effect of financial reporting incentives on Timeliness. 
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Table 4: Comparison of Earnings Attributes Between Quebec and Matched Non-Quebec 
Firms 
 
This table compares earnings attributes from Quebec firms to their non-Quebec matched pairs.  
The sample consists of all firms-years for the matched sample and consists of 167 unique 
Quebec firms and their matched pairs. Quebec firms are matched to non-Quebec firms on 
incorporation level, industry and market value and all overlapping firm-years are retained 
resulting in 738 firm-years.  The statistical tests of differences are based on bootstrap-based tests 
(see Section 6 for details). 
 
Panel A: Accounting-Based Earnings Attributes 
    (1)   (2)   (1) - (2)       
Earnings Attributes Quebec Non-Quebec Difference p-value 
Accrual Quality 0.076 0.095 -0.019 <0.01 *** 
Persistence 0.436 0.648 -0.212 0.04 ** 
Predictability 1.127 1.534 -0.407 0.02 ** 
Smoothness 0.924 0.948 -0.024 0.27 
                    
***, **, * indicates statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed).  
 
Accrual Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on 
future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations. Persistence is the 
estimated slope coefficient from an AR1 model of annual earnings. Predictability is the standard 
deviation of the residual from the Persistence regression. Smoothness is the ratio of the standard 
deviation of earnings before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of 
cash flows from operations (scaled by assets).  
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Table 4: Comparison of Earnings Attributes Between Quebec and Matched Non-Quebec 
Firms (continued) 
 
Panel B: Market-Based Earnings Attributes 
    (1)   (2)   (1) - (2)       
Earnings Attributes Quebec Non-Quebec Difference p-value 
Relevance 0.031 0.061 -0.029 0.21 
Timeliness 0.115 0.070 0.044 0.09 * 
Conservatism 0.431 0.424 0.007 0.46 
                    
***, **, * indicates statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed).  
 
Relevance is the adjusted R2 from a regression of annual returns on the level and change in 
annual earnings (before extraordinary items). Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from a regression of 
annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator variable equaling one if the 
company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the 
interaction of the annual return and the indicator variable. Conservatism is the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction variable from the Timeliness regression. 
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Given the self-selection issue raised in Table 2, with regards to managers’ decision about 
where to incorporate, we also repeated our analysis after controlling for whether firms 
incorporated under either Federal statute (CBCA) or provincial statutes of incorporation.  These 
results are reported in Table 5.  Panel A of Table 5 makes pairwise comparisons of accounting-
based earnings attributes for firms that incorporated under Federal and provincial statutes, 
respectively.  First, we find that the differences reported in Panel A of Table 4 in Accrual Quality 
and Persistence are driven by matched pairs of firms that reported under provincial statute.  Since 
our selection model for managers’ incorporation decision outside Quebec – as reported in Table 
2 – is driven by the two variables that we use for matching in this analysis, Size and Industry, we 
have no reason to believe that differences across non-Quebec provincial statutes constrain firm 
managers’ subsequent financial reporting incentives.  However, our model for managers’ 
incorporation decision also reveals that Quebec firms’ incorporation decision differs from that of 
non-Quebec firms.  As a consequence, differences might persist when comparing provincial 
statutes simply due to unmodeled differences in the incorporation decision.  Again, these 
differences could be explained by the fact that QCA lends lower degree of protection of minority 
shareholder rights than other non-Quebec provincial statutes. 
Panel A of Table 5 also reports statistically significant differences in Predictability and 
Smoothness.  These latter differences, however, are driven by matched pairs of firms that 
reported under the same Federal statute.  As a consequence, these differences are not likely 
subject to the concern that incorporation decision differences fully explain the difference in 
subsequent financial reporting incentives.  Panel B of Table 5 reports that our differences in 
Timeliness reported in Panel B of Table 4 appear to be driven by differences among matched 
pairs of firms which incorporated under the provincial statute. 
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Table 5: Pairwise Comparisons  
This table compares earnings attributes from Quebec firms to their non-Quebec matched pairs 
partitioned on the level of incorporation.  The sample consists of all firms-years for the matched 
sample and consists of 167 unique Quebec firms (65 QCA and 102 CBCA firms) and their 
matched pairs. Quebec firms are matched to non-Quebec firms on incorporation level, industry 
and market value and all overlapping firm-years are retained resulting in 738 firm-years (338 
firm-years for QCA firms and 405 firm-years for CBCA firms).  The statistical tests of 
differences are based on bootstrap-based tests (see Section 6 for details). 
 
Panel A: Accounting-Based Earnings Attributes 
Incorporation   Location           
(1) (2) (1) - (2)   
Quebec Non-Quebec Difference p-value 
Accrual Quality 
CBCA 0.072 
 
0.078 -0.006 0.22 
Provincial 0.079 
 
0.112 -0.033 <0.01 *** 
    Persistence 
CBCA 0.484 
 
0.638 -0.155 0.16 
Provincial 0.365 
 
0.667 -0.301 0.07 * 
   Predictability 
CBCA 1.102 
 
1.724 -0.622 0.02 ** 
Provincial 1.153 
 
1.271 -0.119 0.33 
    Smoothness 
CBCA 1.070 
 
0.945 0.124 0.09 * 
Provincial 0.896 
 
0.949 -0.053 0.12 
                    
***, **, * indicates statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed).  
 
Accrual Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on 
future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations. Persistence is the 
estimated slope coefficient from an AR1 model of annual earnings. Predictability is the standard 
deviation of the residual from the Persistence regression. Smoothness is the ratio of the standard 
deviation of earnings before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of 
cash flows from operations (scaled by assets).  
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Table 5: Pairwise Comparisons (continued) 
 
Panel B: Market-Based Earnings Attributes 
Location   Incorporation           
(1) (2) (1) - (2)   
Quebec Non-Quebec Difference p-value 
    Relevance 
CBCA 0.052 
 
0.111 -0.059 0.14 
Provincial 0.022 
 
0.033 -0.011 0.39 
 
              
Timeliness 
CBCA 0.121 
 
0.109 0.012 0.42 
Provincial 0.110 
 
0.037 0.074 0.06 * 
 
              
Conservatism 
CBCA 0.316 
 
0.469 -0.153 0.11 
Provincial 0.551 
 
0.382 0.169 0.14 
                    
***, **, * indicates statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed).  
 
Relevance is the adjusted R2 from a regression of annual returns on the level and change in 
annual earnings (before extraordinary items). Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from a regression of 
annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator variable equaling one if the 
company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the 
interaction of the annual return and the indicator variable. Conservatism is the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction variable from the Timeliness regression. 
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In summary, we find that differences in earnings attributes persist after controlling for the 
accounting standards.  Our results also point to the importance of controlling for the 
incorporation decision.  After controlling for both accounting standards and for the incorporation 
decision, we still find differences in earnings attributes.   
     7.  Conclusion and Future Work 
 This paper investigates whether intra-country variation in legal origin manifests itself in 
variation in earnings attributes.  Specifically, this paper documents variation among Canadian 
firms’ earnings attributes along two dimensions: the location of firms' headquarters (inside or 
outside Quebec) and the incorporation either at the federal level (CBCA) or at the provincial 
level.  Overall, our results suggest that managers’ financial reporting incentives – perhaps driven 
by financial statement users’ differential demand for earnings quality – may differ between civil 
law and common law regions of a country.  On the one hand, Kedia and Rajgopal (2010) offer 
evidence consistent with geographical variation in financial reporting incentives within the US as 
they document that SEC enforcement varies with distance of firms’ headquarters from the 
nearest SEC regional office.  On the other hand, Bozec, Rousseau, and Laurin (2008) and 
Merrell (2010) document intra-country variation in ownership structure for Canada and US.  
Their findings could suggest that legal origin, ownership structure, and firms' incorporation 
decisions are codetermined and may jointly affect financial reporting incentives. 
Kedia and Rajgopal (2009) document variation in the usage of stock options within the 
US.  Future research might investigate whether executive compensation practices vary within 
Canada between Quebec and non-Quebec companies.  While such variation in compensation 
practices could be attributable to legal origin, this variation might also arise due to partially 
segmented labor markets due to language barriers.  A French speaking executive in Quebec 
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might be more likely to be hired by a company based in France than a company based in 
the US or the rest of Canada.  Similarly, an English speaking Canadian executive working 
outside Quebec might be less likely to be hired by a Quebec-based firm where French is the 
working language than a US-based firm where English is the working language.  Since Europe, 
in general, has lower pay than North America, we would expect lower labor mobility from 
Canada to France than to the US.  Such differences in getting hired might arise from the demand 
or supply side of the labor market.  The demand for executives are likely driven by the language 
and overall culture a firm and its board members.  The supply of executives willing to move are 
likely guided by the immediate family’s functional language and proximity to other family 
members.  Of course, the research setting for such an experiment is not exclusive to Canada, 
since Belgium is a civil law country which has a similar partition with the north and south being 
culturally and language-wise closer to The Netherlands and France, respectively.  Further, this 
experiment is more difficult because executive compensation has not traditionally been disclosed 
in a transparent and consistent manner across Europe.  In summary, this paper suggests future 
research that may further develop and address intra-country variation in corporate governance 
outcomes. 
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Chapter 1 Appendix 
Prior research on intra-country variation in legal origin concentrated on the area where 
differences are likely most pronounced, namely Quebec.  Even Wikipedia acknowledges its 
unique status within Canada: 
“Quebec law is unique in Canada because Quebec is the only province in Canada to have 
a bijuridical legal system under which civil matters are regulated by French-heritage civil 
law and criminal law operates according to Canadian common law.” 
This chapter introduced a second experimental setting where differences, albeit likely less 
pronounced, might also arise.17  Again Wikipedia would suggest this to be the case: 
“Law in the State of Louisiana is based in part on civil law. Louisiana is unique among 
the 50 U.S. states in having a legal system partially based on French and Spanish codes 
and ultimately Roman law, as opposed to English common law.[1] Louisiana thus 
follows the system of most non-Anglophone countries in the world.” 
Another US state that has unique institutional features is Hawaii. Although it had some 
adaptations from its kigdom past, it does not seem as distinct from English common law as 
Louisiana. 
Among the US territories some are unincorporated organized territories: Guam, Northern 
Mariana Islands (commonwealth), Puerto Rico (commonwealth), and the United States Virgin 
                              
17
 A good summary with other references can be found at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quebec_law 
and  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louisiana_law. 
 
106 
 
 
     
Islands.18  Among these, Puerto Rico might allow a feasible experimental setting for further 
investigating the effect of legal origin. Wikipedia also acknowledges this: 
“The legal system of Puerto Rico is a mix of the civil law and the common law 
systems… The Puerto Rico Code (Leyes de Puerto Rico) is modeled on the Spanish Civil 
Code, which is part of the Law of Spain.” 
“Puerto Rico is an "unincorporated territory" of the United States which according to the 
U.S. Supreme Court's Insular Cases is "a territory appurtenant and belonging to the 
United States, but not a part of the United States."[50] Puerto Rico is subject to the 
Congress’ plenary powers under the territorial clause of Article IV, sec. 3, of the U.S. 
Constitution.[51] U.S. federal law applies to Puerto Rico, even though Puerto Rico is not 
a state of the American Union and has no voting representative in the U.S. Congress. 
Because of the establishment of the Federal Relations Act of 1950, all federal laws that 
are "not locally inapplicable" are automatically the law of the land in Puerto Rico.” 
     
But for Puerto Rico, the remaining unincorporated territories of the U.S. seem to rely almost 
entirely on tourism and therefore do not provide a representative set of industries. 
  
                              
18
 US also includes islands in the South Pacific that are unincorporated, unorganized territories: self-governing 
American Samoa and Wake Island, which is inhabited only by US military and civilian contractors.  Neither has 
sufficient business to allow an empirical study. 
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Chapter 2 Appendix A 
 
Appendix A:  Provincial and Federal Corporate Acts and Regulators 
 
Province   Corporate Law      Regulator 
Alberta   Alberta Business Corporations Act   Alberta Securities Commission 
British Columbia  British Columbia Business Corporations Act  British Columbia Securities Commission 
Manitoba   Manitoba Corporations Act    Manitoba Securities Commission 
New Brunswick  New Brunswick Business Corporations Act  New Brunswick Securities Commission 
Newfoundland  and Labrador Newfoundland Corporations Act   Newfoundland and Labrador, Securities Division  
Nova Scotia   Nova Scotia Companies Act    Nova Scotia Securities Commission 
Ontario   Ontario Business Corporations Act   Ontario Securities Commission 
Prince Edward Island  Prince Edward Island Companies Act    
Quebec   Quebec Companies Act    Autorité des Marchés Financiers 
Saskatchewan   Saskatchewan Companies Act   Saskatchewan Securities Commission 
Yukon Territory  Yukon Business Corporations Act   Registrar of Securities, Yukon Territory 
 
Federal    Canadian Business Corporate Act  
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Chapter 2 Appendix B: Evidence from Louisiana 
 
 
In the US, common law prevails at the federal level and at the state level, except for one 
state which has a French legal origin, Louisiana.  The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
requires what firms must register their securities.19  While securities regulation also arises in 
parallel at the state level, this is largely viewed as coordinated and subsumed by federal 
regulation.  In contrast to Canada, no incorporation statute, which affects corporate governance 
and shareholder rights, exists at the federal level.  U.S. companies must incorporate in a state and 
the majority chooses Delaware.  We note that some companies elect to incorporate in Louisiana.  
While Louisiana corporate law has integrated much of the common law structure, differences 
still remain (Merrell 2011).   
A common criticism of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) (and 
other across country studies) is that other factors might be causing the differences in the 
corporate governance outcomes that they document.  Religion, culture, language, and other 
factors are offered as alternative explanations for differences in ownership concentration.  
Examining ownership concentration in Louisiana provides a novel setting where religion, culture 
and language vary little when compared to other U.S. states.  By comparing the earnings 
attributes of firms in Louisiana, we are able to control for important confounding factors and 
further the literature on the effects of legal origin by potentially ruling out these alternative 
explanations.   
 
  
                              
19
 Under the U.S. Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934. 
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Background on Louisiana Law 
 Comparisons between Louisiana’s Code and other states’ laws can be difficult to 
enumerate.  There are two factors that make delineating the distinction difficult.  First, The Code 
is not meant to be a straight jacket but more of a set of safeguards (Moreteau 2008).  It might be 
more appropriate to compare The Code to The Constitution in this respect, particularly The Bill 
of Rights.  For instance, The Code specifies, “Everyone has the right to respect for his private 
life” and “Everyone has the right to respect of the presumption of innocence.”  Second, 
Louisiana is a state in the US and, therefore, is subject to the US Constitution and other federal 
laws.  Even though Louisiana law is melding closely with other state laws, there still remain non-
trivial variations that could potentially effect investor protections. 
 Today, Louisiana is a decidedly mixed jurisdiction based on civil and common law in 
which “civil law and common law meet, merge and interact at the level of legal rules, institutions 
and reasoning methods” (Palmer 1999).  Though mixed with common law, the civil code of 
Louisiana is still functioning.  As Louisiana Judge Dennis wrote in 2003, “[O]ur Civil Code 
endures and generally governs the all important area of Louisiana's private law” (Dennis 2003).  
An example of how investor protections, specifically minority shareholder rights, may 
differ under the Louisiana Civil Code can be found in the case Yuspeh v.  Koch.  In this case, 
Koch, a majority shareholder of Certified Security Systems, attempted to gain full control of the 
company via a freeze-out merger with a set cash price to buy out minority shareholders.  Yuseph 
and minority shareholders sued for what they deemed to be an inadequate stock price.  Further 
the minority shareholders had not been informed of Koch’s increased ownership of the company 
which was through unissued stock purchases via a loan restructuring agreement and, therefore, 
sued for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.  Koch filed an exception of no right of action 
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arguing that Louisiana Revised Statute section 12:131 (from Louisiana’s Civil Code) was 
the sole remedy for obtaining the fair value for their shares.  This would have required Yuspeh to 
have used an injunction to slow the merger process and receive fair value for their shares.  The 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Louisiana statue is not the exclusive remedy 
because it does not address fraud or breach of fiduciary responsibility.  Although the court ruled 
that no fraud was committed, it ruled there was a breach of fiduciary responsibility by not 
informing shareholders of the additional stock purchase.  This breach was a direct cause for the 
plaintiffs not being able to utilize the statue to obtain fair value for their positions.  Although the 
ruling helped align Louisiana’s protection of minority shareholder’s rights in this case 
(specifically similar to Delaware’s Weinberger v.  UOP, Inc.  decision), calls for a statute to 
better identify these protections remain.  “A new Louisiana appraisal rights statute should 
include a requirement that a minority shareholder be given proper shareholder notice before and 
after the merger vote to provide him with greater knowledge of his rights and responsibilities” 
(Aiken 2004).    
 
Data 
To identify our sample, we first identified firms incorporated or located in Louisiana on 
the Compustat Xpressfeed North America database from 1970 to 2009.  We retain all firms with 
necessary financial statement information to construct all seven attributes are available for each 
firm-year to mitigate concerns that differences in sample composition affect comparisons across 
attributes.  To construct annual returns, we obtain monthly returns data from CRSP.  We exclude 
firms in the financial and utilities industries.  The number of firms meeting these requirements is 
51. 
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We follow the same matching procedure as in the Quebec portion of our study, except 
that we match Louisiana firms with non-Louisiana firms (firms that are neither located or 
incorporated in Louisiana) on size and industry.  We do not match on the level of incorporation 
because unlike the Quebec portion of our study, no federal incorporation statute exists in the US.  
Following this procedure, we obtain a sample of 51 Louisiana firms (22 firms incorporated in 
Louisiana and 29 firms located but not incorporated in Louisiana) with 475 firm-year 
observations.  Untabulated results confirm an effective match on size. 
 
Earnings Attributes  
Table B1 compares all Louisiana firms, whether incorporated or located in Louisiana, to 
their non-Louisiana matched pairs.  We find that Conservatism is higher in firms with a French 
legal origin than a common law legal origin, consistent with our Quebec findings, and 
inconsistent with the hypothesis from Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000).  In general, however, we 
fail to document significant differences across the various earnings attributes.  This may be due 
to low statistical from our small sample size.  Alternatively, the presence of a strong federal 
regulator, the SEC, and federal securities regulation in the US may lead to comparable earnings 
quality across firms from common and civil law states. 
Further, the inclusion of firms located, but not incorporated in Louisiana, may add noise 
to our tests if only incorporation law, and not other aspects of Louisiana law, affects earnings 
quality.  In this case, comparing firms incorporated in Louisiana to their non-Louisiana matched 
pairs should provide the most powerful test for differences in earnings quality across civil and 
common law states.  Table B2 presents the earnings attributes for firms incorporated in 
Louisiana and their non-Louisiana matched pairs.  We find that Relevance is higher for the 
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Louisiana firms than for non-Louisiana firms.  However, in general we fail to find 
significant difference across the various earnings attributes.  As before, the lack of results may be 
attributable to the small sample size, or may be due to the strong federal regulatory environment 
in the US that results in similar earnings quality across common and civil law states. 
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Table B1:  Comparison of Earnings Attributes Between Louisiana and Matched Non-
Louisiana Firms 
 
This table compares earnings attributes from Louisiana firms to their non-Louisiana matched 
pairs.  The sample consists of all firms-years for the matched sample and consists of 51 unique 
Louisiana firms and their matched pairs. Louisiana firms are matched to non-Louisiana firms on 
industry and market value and all overlapping firm-years are retained resulting in 475 firm-years.  
The statistical tests of differences are based on bootstrap-based tests (see Section 6 for details). 
 
Panel A: Accounting-Based Earnings Attributes 
    (1)   (2)   (1) - (2)       
Earnings Attributes Louisiana Non-Louisiana Difference p-value 
Accrual Quality 0.070 0.063 0.007 0.15 
Persistence 0.555 0.797 -0.242 0.18 
Predictability 7.580 6.277 1.303 0.26 
Smoothness 1.265 1.181 0.084 0.36 
                    
***, **, * indicates statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed).  
 
Accrual Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on 
future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations. Persistence is the 
estimated slope coefficient from an AR1 model of annual earnings. Predictability is the standard 
deviation of the residual from the Persistence regression. Smoothness is the ratio of the standard 
deviation of earnings before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of 
cash flows from operations (scaled by assets).  
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Table B1:  Comparison of Earnings Attributes Between Louisiana and Matched Non-
Louisiana Firms (continued) 
 
Panel B: Market-Based Earnings Attributes 
    (1)   (2)   (1) - (2)       
Earnings Attributes Louisiana Non-Louisiana Difference p-value 
Relevance 0.104 0.047 0.057 0.19 
Timeliness 0.087 0.093 -0.006 0.43 
Conservatism 0.695 0.282 0.413 0.04 ** 
                    
***, **, * indicates statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed).  
 
Relevance is the adjusted R2 from a regression of annual returns on the level and change in 
annual earnings (before extraordinary items). Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from a regression of 
annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator variable equaling one if the 
company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the 
interaction of the annual return and the indicator variable. Conservatism is the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction variable from the Timeliness regression. 
 
  
115 
 
 
      
Table B2:  Comparison of Earnings Attributes Between Louisiana and Matched Non-
Louisiana Firms – Firms Incorporated in Louisiana 
 
This table compares earnings attributes from Louisiana firms that are incorporated in Louisiana 
to their non-Louisiana matched pairs.  The sample consists of all firms-years for the matched 
sample and consists of 22 unique Louisiana firms and their matched pairs. Louisiana firms are 
matched to non-Louisiana firms on industry and market value and all overlapping firm-years are 
retained resulting in 209 firm-years.  The statistical tests of differences are based on bootstrap-
based tests (see Section 6 for details). 
 
Panel A: Accounting-Based Earnings Attributes 
    (1)   (2)   (1) - (2)       
Earnings Attributes Louisiana Non-Louisiana Difference p-value 
Accrual Quality 0.066 0.077 -0.011 0.13 
Persistence 0.555 0.801 -0.246 0.19 
Predictability 10.552 8.944 1.607 0.31 
Smoothness 1.546 1.254 0.292 0.14 
                    
 ***, **, * indicates statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-
tailed).  
 
Accrual Quality is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of accruals on 
future year, current year, and previous year’s cash flows from operations. Persistence is the 
estimated slope coefficient from an AR1 model of annual earnings. Predictability is the standard 
deviation of the residual from the Persistence regression. Smoothness is the ratio of the standard 
deviation of earnings before extraordinary items (scaled by assets) to the standard deviation of 
cash flows from operations (scaled by assets).  
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Table B2:  Comparison of Earnings Attributes Between Louisiana and Matched Non-
Louisiana Firms – Firms Incorporated in Louisiana (continued) 
 
Panel B: Market-Based Earnings Attributes 
    (1)   (2)   (1) - (2)       
Earnings Attributes Louisiana Non-Louisiana Difference p-value 
Relevance 0.051 0.027 0.024 0.01 *** 
Timeliness 0.073 0.050 0.023 0.32 
Conservatism 0.518 0.243 0.275 0.16 
                    
 ***, **, * indicates statistically different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-
tailed).  
 
Relevance is the adjusted R2 from a regression of annual returns on the level and change in 
annual earnings (before extraordinary items). Timeliness is the adjusted R2 from a regression of 
annual earnings (before extraordinary items) on an indicator variable equaling one if the 
company’s annual return is negative and zero otherwise, the company’s annual return, and the 
interaction of the annual return and the indicator variable. Conservatism is the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction variable from the Timeliness regression. 
 
 
